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THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASES OF EDUCATION

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
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TO

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P R E F A C E

ALTHOUGH their contents generally belie their titles, the recent publication of a number of works designated "Philosophy of Education" indicates a revival of interest in the subject, and the following pages are presented in the hope of stimulating that interest and directing it along more strictly philosophical lines.

The scientific or naturalistic standpoint has been ably stated in Professor Nunn's *Education : Its Data and First Principles*; the practical or pragmatic in Professor Dewey's *Democracy and Education*; this work offers a restatement of the philosophy of education from the idealistic standpoint.

As the literature on which the argument is based may not always be convenient of access, it has been deemed advisable in general to cite authorities verbatim and to make the references, direct and indirect, as precise as possible. To Mr. J. R. Cameron, Rector of Falkirk High School, the writer is indebted for assistance in revision of proofs.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASES OF EDUCATION

CHAPTER I

THE NEED FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

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Mutual dependence of philosophy and education—modern estrangement and its consequences—necessity for a philosophy—avoidance of issue—no alternative to a philosophy—dependence of aim, curriculum, school-books, discipline, organisation, on a philosophy.

A NOTEWORTHY feature of the doctrines of the great educators who are also great philosophers, is the emergence, and reflection, of their philosophical views in their educational schemes or in the educational systems of their times. We need only cite Plato's idealism and his cultural scheme of education ; Rationalism and Formal Training ; Empiricism in philosophy and Encyclopædism in education ; Rousseau's anti-social philosophy and his negative or natural education ; Spencer's Hedonism and his discipline by natural consequences ; and American Pragmatism and the Project method in Education. This connection likewise suggests that the benefit may have been mutual, that in the development of the philosophical thought of such writers their educational ideas may have played a not unimportant part.

The latter may have served as a control or corrective of their philosophical views, so that their philosophy may have gained as much from their consideration of education as their theory of education from their philosophy.. This mutual dependence was affirmed by Fichte in his *Addresses to the German People*¹ ; "the art of education," he said, "will never attain complete clearness in itself without philosophy. Hence, there is an interaction between the two, and either without the other is incomplete and unserviceable." Dewey has even gone so far as to maintain that the most penetrating definition of philosophy which can be given is that it is the theory of education in its most general phases.²

The modern estrangement of philosophy and education is doubtless unfortunate for both. Certain present-day exponents of philosophy affect to despise education, thus betraying the restricted view they take of their own sphere ; we need only recall to them that such ancient philosophers as Plato and Aristotle, and such modern philosophers as Locke and Kant, to instance but two from each period, did not regard education as a study unworthy of consideration, and that for the sake of both subjects a spirit of mutual toleration had better again be cultivated.

¹ Sixth Address.

² *Democracy and Education*, p. 386.

Our concern, however, is rather with the dependence of education on philosophy, for, as Spencer has said, true education is practicable only to a true philosopher, and Gentile in *The Reform of Education*¹ has warned us that the belief that men may continue to educate without concerning themselves with the subtle problems of philosophy, means a failure to understand the precise nature of education.]

The dogmatism which for long dominated educational thought, "the unanimity of the ignorant," as Spencer phrased it, has passed, and a feverish activity now characterises every aspect of educational endeavour. Investigation and experiment, hydra-like, raise more problems than they solve. To enumerate these problems is impossible, for their name is legion. More urgent, nevertheless, is the need for a reconsideration of the fundamental concepts of the subject. A co-ordinating, if not a determining principle, is requisite, if we are not to be lost in the maze of modern developments, and such a principle can only be furnished by a philosophy of the subject. Our real study, Rousseau avers,² is that of human destiny ; and Fichte³ goes further and regards education as an investigation of the divine will.]

¹ English Trans., p. 223.

² *Emile*, Payne's Abridged Trans., p. 9..

³ G. H. Turnbull, *Educational Theory of Fichte*, p. 276.

Many educationists counsel us to ignore this difficulty. Thus Herbart maintains¹ that education has no time to make holiday till philosophical questions are once for all cleared up.² We must, notwithstanding, rather agree with J. S. Mill when he writes³ : “There is little chance of making due amends in the superstructure of a theory for the want of sufficient breadth in its foundation. It is unphilosophical to construct a science out of a few of the agencies by which the phenomena are determined, and leave the rest to the routine of practice or the sagacity of conjecture. We either ought not to pretend to scientific forms, or we ought to study all the determining agencies equally, and endeavour, so far as it can be done, to include all of them within the pale of the science.” Others adopt the sceptical attitude, contending, like Nunn,⁴ that as the ideals of life are eternally at variance their conflict will be reflected in educational theories, and concluding therefrom that there can be no universal aim of education. This is, however, quite illogical ; we admit when thinkers philosophise about life, they are prone to lay exclusive stress upon one or other of its contradictory aspects,⁴ but the cure

¹ *Allgemeine Pädagogik*, *Felkins's Trans.*, p. 108.

² *Logic*, Popular edition, p. 583.

³ T. Percy Nunn, *Education : Its Data and First Principles*, p. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*

for these contradictions is not to give up philosophising, but to seek a sounder and more adequate philosophy.

The answer to every educational question is ultimately influenced by our philosophy of life. Although few formulate it, every system of education must have an aim, and the aim of education is relative to the aim of life. Philosophy formulates what it conceives to be the end of life; education offers suggestions how this end is to be achieved.

Nowhere is this dependence of education on philosophy more marked than in the question of the curriculum. In the first chapter of his work on *Education* Spencer asserts that in the determination of the curriculum "our first step must obviously be to classify, in the order of their importance, the leading kinds of activity which constitute human life." To this principle there can be but little objection. But immediately we seek to fix the relative value of subjects, to classify them "in the order of their importance," differences of aim and of philosophy emerge and confuse the issues. This is apparent in Spencer's own application of the principle, which by reason of his somewhat narrow conception of both man's nature and his environment, is most unfortunate. Man's nature is by him regarded as purely individualistic; self-preserva-

tion is, for him, the first law of life, hence the subjects which minister to self-preservation are given first place. Spencer by reason of his naturalistic philosophy and hedonistic ethics likewise underestimates the great importance of man's social or cultural inheritance, and as a result assigns too little value to subjects of the cultural type and to subjects which train for the right enjoyment of leisure.

The surprising and welcome interest and activity recently manifested in the problem of the curriculum is at present arrested for the want of a philosophical criterion. Thus Bode remarks¹ that unless we have some sort of guiding philosophy in the determination of objectives we get nowhere at all, and Briggs in discussing *Curriculum Problems*² says: "It is just here that education seriously needs leaders—leaders who hold a sound comprehensive philosophy of which they can convince others, and who can direct its consistent application to the formulation of appropriate curricula."

Specific curriculum problems likewise demand a philosophy for their satisfactory solution. The controversy recently raging in this country regarding the place of Imagination in Education and the inclusion of fairy tales in the curriculum is

¹ B. H. Bode, *Modern Educational Theories*, p. 87.

² P. 8.

at bottom a problem in educational philosophy, hence its apparent insolubility. Those who advocate the teaching of fairy tales assume that the real is material, and that only by withdrawal from the real can the spiritual in the child's nature find an opportunity for development, whereas when the real is regarded as rational and spiritual, and when the romance of the real is recognised, imagination will not have to depend on mere fantasy for its means of development. Educationists have been wont to maintain that education should prepare for leisure as well as for work, but the philosopher startles us by asserting that the programme of education for leisure is a counsel of despair.¹ The contradiction results from a difference of philosophical standpoint. The philosopher, on the one hand, looking at life from the idealistic standpoint believes that work can, and ought to, be humanised, that man should be able to find satisfaction in his labour, that "we have somehow to discover *there* a theatre for the attainment if not of the highest, certainly of genuine spiritual values." The educationist, on the other hand, has assumed a principle of "com-

¹ H. J. W. Hetherington, "The Incidence of Philosophy on Education," *The Forum of Education*, vol. iv, No. 3 (November 1926), p. 191.

This is one of the many dualisms in education of which Dewey disposes in his *Democracy and Education*.

pensation," "the theory, namely, that the rewards of many, if not of most, of our occupations are to be found entirely outside the occupations themselves—in high wages, in longer periods of freedom from work, in recreations, hobbies, excitements, interests, studies—anywhere but in the work itself."¹ It is not without significance that almost the best plea ever made for practical work in schools was penned by one of the most idealistic of educational philosophers, namely, Fröbel.²

Intimately connected with the question of the curriculum is the adoption of appropriate text-books, and this too involves a philosophy, as Briggs has recently recognised, saying³ : "Everyone familiar with the ways in which text-books are selected must be convinced of the need for ideals and standards. The reason they have not been prepared and accepted in practice is the same as that for slow progress in curriculum revision: they must be underlain by an entire and consistent philosophy of education."

As with curriculum, so with method. The outstanding problem in educational method at the present time is the extent to which, if at all,

¹ *Ibid.*

² *The Education of Man.* Cf. also Fichte, *Addresses to the German People*, English Trans., pp. 34, 183.

³ B. H. Briggs, *Curriculum Problems*, p. 42.

the teacher should intervene in the educative process, and this raises philosophical issues. Non-intervention is justified for two quite different reasons, either because of the nature of the pupil's endowment or because of his environment. Rousseau, Fichte, and Fröbel all assume that the child's nature is good, and any intervention is consequently harmful, hence the "negative" or preventive education of Rousseau and the "passive" education of Fröbel. Montessori takes the environmentalist standpoint, and assumes that as the environment, comprising the didactic apparatus, etc., which she has prepared for the child, is ideal and perfectly adapted to evoke only the right type of response and the good impulses of the child, the teacher's intervention is unnecessary and unjustified. The one class believes that the endowment is good or right, the other that the environment is good, but it is at once evident that complete non-intervention is only justified when both are perfect. The school itself is a form of intervention, and the problem is not whether the teacher's intervention is justified or not, but whether it is prudent and timely. The intervention in the new education is less obtrusive than in the old ; the teacher prepares the environment with greater care and his influence on the pupil is more indirect—acting by means of suggestion rather than by instruction.

and admonition, but probably for these reasons, not less effective.

Kilpatrick's introduction of the term "philosophy of method," a term which a few years ago would either have been regarded as meaningless or as a contradiction in terms, is evidence of the intimate connection between educational method and philosophy. The teacher who keeps consciously before himself the aim of education must necessarily realise "the wider meaning of method."¹ Method is merely the process of establishing and maintaining contact between the pupil and the subject-matter, yet through failure to recognise the wider meaning of method, to possess a definite aim in education or an adequate philosophy of life, the very method which some teachers employ, instead of creating in the pupils the right attitude, as Kilpatrick requires, results merely in repelling the pupil from the subject. Teachers who assume that they can afford to ignore philosophy, pay the penalty of their neglect, for their efforts, lacking a co-ordinating principle, are thereby rendered ineffective.²

¹ *The Foundations of Method*, chs. viii, ix.

² Cf. the statement in the *Cambridge Syllabus of Religious Instruction*, p. 38: "Unless all the teaching throughout all the school is infused with a sense of earnest inquiry and with a conviction of the reality of God's presence among men, the specific Religious Instruction will be sterile and uninspiring."

Discipline reflects the philosophical prepossessions of an individual or an age more directly than any other aspect of school work. We have already instanced the dependence of discipline by natural consequences on a hedonistic ethics and a naturalistic metaphysics ; and freedom in education implies an idealistic philosophy. The general relationship was well expressed by Spencer in the following passage¹ : "There cannot fail to be a relationship between the successive systems of education, and the successive social states with which they have co-existed. Having a common origin in the natural mind, the institutions of each epoch, whatever be their special functions, must have a family likeness. . . . Along with political despotism, stern in its commands, ruling by force of terror, visiting trifling crimes with death, and implacable in its vengeance on the disloyal, there necessarily grew up an academic discipline similarly harsh—a discipline of multiplied injunctions and blows for every breach of them—a discipline of unlimited autocracy upheld by rods, and ferules, and the black-hole. On the other hand, the increase of political liberty, the abolition of laws restricting individual action, and the amelioration of the criminal code, have been accompanied by a kindred progress towards non-coercive education : the pupil is hampered

¹ *Education*, ch. ii.

by fewer restraints, and other means than punishment are used to govern him. . . . Thus, alike in its oracular dogmatism, in its harsh discipline, in its multiplied restrictions, in its professed asceticism, and in its faith in the devices of men, the old educational régime was akin to the social systems with which it was contemporaneous ; and similarly, in the reverse of these characteristics, our modern modes of culture correspond to our more liberal religious and political institutions."

An instrument recently put at the disposal of the educational administrator is the mental test, and it is instructive to find a writer insisting that to evolve the type of personality required by the clinical psychologist "a definite philosophy is needed."¹ And in a succeeding chapter of this work the writer explains how the fatalism in mental testing to which Bagley² has directed attention, is the result of a naturalistic interpretation of experience.

From every angle of the educational problem comes thus the demand for a philosophical basis of the subject. There is no escape from a philosophy of life and of education. Those who pride themselves on their neglect of philosophy, have their own philosophy—usually a quite

¹ F. Mateer, *The Unstable Child*, p. 57.

² *Determinism in Education*.

inadequate one; every man, as Schopenhauer says, is a born metaphysician. "There are some people—and I am one of them—" says Chesterton, "who think that the most practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger it is important to know his income, but still more to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy it is important to know the enemy's numbers, but still more important to know the enemy's philosophy. We think the question is not whether the theory of the cosmos affects matters, but whether in the long run anything else affects them." There is probably no worker whose practice is more affected by his philosophy than the teacher's¹; it consequently behoves him, as he cannot avoid it, to secure as adequate a philosophy as he can command.

¹ I. E. Miller in *Education for the Needs of Life* (p. 314) claims: "One's attitude toward life may be a very decisive factor in his teaching at very critical points. It makes a profound difference to the work of the instructor whether his philosophy of life is crassly materialistic or whether it is idealistic enough to make him believe in the imperishability of moral and spiritual values. It makes a difference to his own interest and enthusiasm, and in what he selects for emphasis in his instruction."

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CHAPTER II

SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY

Naturalism, Idealism and Scepticism, the main schools of Philosophy—Scepticism, no influence on education—Pragmatism combines naturalistic hypotheses with idealistic conclusions. Naturalism, the result of approaching philosophy from scientific standpoint—tendency to ignore spiritual factors—education from the biological standpoint naturalistic. Idealism, more comprehensive than naturalism—emphasises spiritual and cultural factors. Pragmatism, typical of American life—attempts to make the best of both material efficiency and idealistic tendencies—synthesis unsatisfactory—but a step on the way to a new idealism.

THERE are three great schools of philosophical thought—Naturalism, Idealism and Scepticism. Scepticism, while it has had a stimulating influence on general philosophical development, has no value for the philosophy of education, for it tends to paralyse action, and the educative process being essentially a practical activity resolves the perplexities propounded by the sceptic simply by ignoring them. We are then left with Naturalism and Idealism as the chief philosophical doctrines having educational implications and significance. To these should perhaps be added Pragmatism, a fairly recent development, which combines the methods of Naturalism with the conclusions of Idealism.

Naturalism is the philosophical position adopted wittingly or unwittingly by those who approach philosophy from the purely scientific standpoint. They tend to carry the natural laws into the spiritual world and to apply to the whole of experience conceptions and categories valid only in their restricted sphere ; they tend to reduce the distinctively rational or spiritual factors in human experience to purely physical or biological functions. At one time physical concepts were regarded as absolute and ultimate ; " matter " in its crude form, as then conceived by physicists, was regarded as the first word and final explanation of all the problems of mind and existence. The hopeless attitude to life engendered by Materialism was eloquently expressed by Lord Balfour in his *Foundations of Belief*¹ : " The energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The uneasy consciousness which in this obscure corner has for a brief space broken the contented silence of the universe, will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. ' Imperishable monuments ' and ' immortal deeds,' death itself, and love stronger than death, will be as if they had not

¹ P. 30.

been. Nor will anything that is, be better or worse for all that the labour, genius, devotion and suffering of man have striven through countless ages to effect." Such a philosophy with its pessimistic conclusions, had it persisted and become universal, would have tended to atrophy human effort ; fortunately it has been generally abandoned, disintegrated from within mainly by the developments of physical science itself. By the analysis of modern physicists matter has become so refined, so etherealized, as to be hardly distinguishable in the popular mind from spirit, and it can now be regarded as a fitting vehicle for the most spiritual activities, and this is conceived to be its main function by certain modern physicists.

Biology superseded Physics, and assumed the rôle of dictating to philosophy on all questions affecting life and conduct. It regarded man as an animal—and nothing more ; what could not be interpreted in biological terms was conveniently ignored. Human nature was viewed exclusively from the natural or animal standpoint, and for the great achievements of man in the spiritual realm, attained through his creative capacity, no explanation was thought to be necessary. Education by its adoption and employment of biological metaphors has unwittingly accepted the naturalistic metaphysic. Botany lent the " plant " analogy,

an analogy as old as Plato, cited by Elyot and Comenius, but generally associated with the name of Fröbel,¹ who, however, was far from being a naturalist in philosophy. Zoology now supplies the analogies and metaphors, and "adaptation" and "recapitulation" have become the ruling concepts in Education. Bertrand Russell has suggested² the adoption of psychological concepts, forgetful of the fact that psychology itself, having run the gamut of scientific metaphor—mechanical, mathematical, physical, chemical—has not yet freed itself from the biological categories. Thus he says : "The conception of society as a tree is better than the mould or the machine, but it is still defective. It is to psychology that we must look to supply the deficiency. Psychological constructiveness is a new and special kind, very little understood as yet. It is essential to a right

¹ Plato, *Republic*, § 491 : "In the case of all seeds, and of everything that grows . . . we know that whatever fails to find its appropriate nourishment, season and soil, will lack its proper virtues."

Elyot, *Governour*, Everyman edition, p. 18 : "I will use the policy of a wise and cunning gardener."

Comenius, *School of Infancy*, p. 11 : "Whoever has within his house youth exercising themselves in these three departments [Faith, Uprightness, Knowledge] possesses a garden in which celestial plantlets are sown, watered, bloom and flourish."

² *On Education*, pp. 115-16.

theory of education, politics, and all human affairs." But even psychology cannot adequately serve ; so long as it regards itself as a positive science, and leaves to logic, ethics and æsthetics the consideration of the norms of valid thinking, of goodness, and of beauty, it cannot serve as an adequate philosophical basis for education.¹

If men of science tend to Naturalism when they philosophise, professional philosophers incline increasingly towards Idealism.² The reason for this is put thus by Kemp Smith³ : "The first steps towards naturalism are easy and convincing. Naturalism takes the present results of the positive sciences at what appears to be their face-value, and from them it professes to obtain data sufficient for the establishment of a comprehensive philosophy. When, however, this

¹ Psychology must either abandon its definition of psychology as *positive* or its claim to provide a *complete* account of the mental life. Its exclusion of "values" has led British psychologists to neglect the psychology of thinking, reasoning and the will. Psychology must also learn to solve its problems by its own methods ; in the past it has evaded its difficulties by retreating into physiology and biology ; at present its favourite retreat is anthropology. What we require of psychology is a psychology from the psychological standpoint.

² Cf. N. Kemp Smith, *The Present Situation in Philosophy*, p. 6 ; R. Eucken, *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, English Trans., p. 163.

³ *The Present Situation in Philosophy*, p. 30.

philosophy is applied in interpretation of the more intimate aspects of human experience, it becomes ever increasingly unsatisfactory. With idealism, on the other hand, the first steps are the most difficult. Its final conclusions exceed the insight yet yielded by the positive sciences, but do not contradict them ; and it may be claimed that they are based upon a more thorough study of those features of our experience which have not yet been subjected to scientific treatment."

Two characteristics serve to distinguish Idealism from Naturalism ; it is more comprehensive,¹ as Kemp Smith in the passage just quoted has suggested, not stopping short in its explanations at what can be reduced to scientific form and leaving unaccounted for, such factors as man's creative capacity in the intellectual sphere and his freedom in the moral sphere ; it also shifts the centre of gravity from the natural or scientific sphere to the spiritual aspects of experience. Instead of, like Naturalism, asking " Why has the body a mind ? " it asks, " Why has the mind a body ? " It contends that in the elements which differentiate man from the rest of creation is to be found the key to the riddle of the universe, that

¹ What philosophy, as compared with science, gains in comprehensiveness, it loses in precision of method. It is also largely dependent on science for its content. The correct attitude for both is one of mutual toleration.

in the specifically human experiences the nature of reality is pre-eminently disclosed, that culture, morality, art and religion are the ultimate realities.

Eucken has sketched¹ in illuminating outline the consequences of the two views : " How the evolution of reality as a whole is to be understood depends chiefly upon whether we recognise in spiritual life *a new stage of life* or whether we see in it nothing more than a mere prolongation of nature. In the former case evolution assumes a different appearance ; the process in which we ourselves are immediately involved, with which we are familiar through experience, does not itself give rise to all progress, the higher does not arise as a mere product of the lower, but new forces belonging to a greater whole enter into the movement. Thus our reality acquires background and depth ; it must adjust itself to the larger whole which includes it. Change is then no longer a mere race without goal or meaning, but moves within the realm of eternal truth, and is borne on by its inspiration. If, on the other hand, spiritual life is a mere by-product of nature, there remains no possibility of providing a counterpoise for change and wresting a content from life ; but humanity and the whole world with it

¹ *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, English Trans., p. 278.

are in headlong flight towards the nothingness which is their sole destination."

The problem is whether the life or activity of man is a mere continuation of a natural process and can be adequately expressed and explained in terms of natural science, or whether in the course of evolution, when man appears, there emerges a distinctive form of reality with categories of its own—categories like freedom and creative capacity, a form of reality to which the categories of natural science, like causality, are not only inadequate but also quite irrelevant. Idealism confers on human life a significance and dignity denied it by scientific naturalism.

Education is at present predominantly naturalistic or biological, the result of being approached from the scientific standpoint.¹ When the inadequacy of the scientific position becomes apparent, we may hope for an Education from a philosophical standpoint that will pay due regard to the spiritual side of man's nature, and to art, morality and religion, the products of such

¹ Cf. G. Gentile, *The Reform of Education*, English Trans., p. 76: "the ordinarily accepted view of educators to-day is realistic rather than otherwise." Certain educational works written avowedly from the biological standpoint, e.g. O'Shea, *Education as Adjustment*, and Miller, *Education for the Needs of Life*, clearly disclose the limitations of this standpoint and emphasise the importance of the creative tendencies in human life.

activity, for which the naturalistic theory of Education can find place only as an afterthought.

Pragmatism is a recent American development, combining, as we have suggested above, the methods of Naturalism with the conclusions of Idealism. That its methods are scientific or naturalistic is definitely admitted by James ; " Messrs. Dewey, Schiller and their allies, in reaching this general conception of all truth, have only followed the example of geologists, biologists, and philologists." ¹ Dewey reveals the naturalistic background of pragmatic education when he affirms : " Man's home is in nature ; his purposes and aims are dependent for execution upon natural conditions. Separated from such conditions they become empty dreams and idle indulgences of fancy. . . . This philosophy is vouched for by the doctrine of biological development which shows that man is continuous with nature, not an alien entering her processes from without." ² Pragmatism, as represented by James, at the same time accepts the validity of religion and the conception of God, whereas Dewey, perhaps more consistently with the pragmatic position,

¹ *Pragmatism*, pp. 58-9.

² *Democracy and Education*, p. 333. Wordsworth believed that heaven was the child's home, and men have died in the belief that heaven was their home—but that was before the days of pragmatic enlightenment.

makes but a passing reference to religion in his *Democracy and Education*,¹ and then only by reason of its conflict with science.

Pragmatism thus evidently seeks to combine two incompatible standpoints, and in doing so typifies the contradiction inherent in American life, clearly recognised by American writers themselves,² of industrial efficiency and material success on the one hand, with idealistic tendencies on the other. It seeks in quite a commendable sense to make the best of both worlds—the Old and the New. It is doubtless merely a stage in the development of a new idealism, not a rationalism which ends in formal training, but an idealism that will do full justice to reality, reconcile the practical and the spiritual values, and result in a culture which is the flower of efficiency and not the negation of it.

¹ P. 381.

² Cf. B. H. Bode, *Modern Educational Theories*, ch. i.

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CHAPTER III

NATURALISM IN EDUCATION

Naturalism characteristic of modern thought—coincident with introduction of scientific conception into Education. Spencer typical of Naturalism in Education—aim, method, etc., dominated by biological categories—ethics of Naturalism hedonistic—discipline by natural consequences the educational corollary. Present-day Naturalism more comprehensive and approximates more closely to Idealism—educational expression in Nunn's "Education : Its Data, etc.,"—autonomous development of individual, the aim of education—biological predestination—adaptation denies creative activity—difficulty in accounting for man's social nature—this view may degenerate into mere self-assertion—substitution of enrichment of personality as aim of education. Eugenics naturalistic—depreciation of education—complementary view. Euthenics—Owen and Kidd exponents of complementary view. Eugenics, need for a philosophy. Modern educational psychology largely naturalistic. Determinism in mental testing the result of Naturalism. Indictment of Naturalism.

NATURALISM is characteristic of modern rather than of ancient thought. Bacon gave to nature a new significance and may be credited with introducing Naturalism into modern philosophy ; he has, as we shall see later, been likewise credited with initiating Pragmatism. Comenius, a contemporary and disciple of Bacon, advocated education according to nature, although his own philosophical position was idealistic. Histories of

Education have usually ascribed the beginnings of Naturalism in Education to Rousseau, whose reiteration of the precept, "Follow Nature," has blinded writers to the fact that nature is opposed by Rousseau not to spirit, but to social convention, and that the natural or negative stage of education is merely preparatory to the moral, æsthetic and religious training of *Emile*.

Naturalism in Education is coincident rather with the introduction of the scientific conception in Education, and Herbert Spencer's work *On Education* is typical of the naturalistic school. Self-preservation is for him the first law of life, and the subjects which minister to self-preservation have priority in his curriculum. Science, contributing largely to the attainment of this end, is exalted ; and Spencer affirms that not only for intellectual discipline is science the best, but also for moral discipline. He overstates his case, however, when he claims that the discipline of science is superior to that of our ordinary education because of the *religious* culture that it gives. One commentator protests¹ that Spencer, looking at life like a biologist, puts bare physical life first in order of importance and relegates the full life of the spirit and the distinctively human things to the class of desirable but dispensable luxuries.

His main principle of method Spencer derives

¹ F. Clarke, *Essays in the Politics of Education*, p. 11.

from animal development, affirming: "The education of the child must accord both in mode and arrangement with the education of mankind considered historically. In other words, the genesis of knowledge in the individual, must follow the same course as the genesis of knowledge in the race." He repeats that education shall be a repetition of civilisation in little, that it shall be as much as possible a process of self-evolution, and that it shall be pleasurable. This doctrine of recapitulation, also accepted by many idealists—Hegel, Fröbel, etc.—derives its main support from biological analogies¹; its weakness is that it ignores the social culture which throughout the ages man has created and conserved, and which from earliest childhood influences, if it does not determine, the child's mental development.

¹ This principle assumes the transmission of acquired characteristics. Whether this is valid on the learning or psychological plane, as distinct from the biological, is still an open question.

Ernest Jones, "Some Problems of Adolescence," *British Journal of Psychology*, vol. xiii (July 1922), p. 40, formulates the principle thus: "the individual *recapitulates and expands* in the second decennium of life the development he passed through during the first five years of life, just as he recapitulates during these first five years the experiences of thousands of years in his ancestry, and during the pre-natal period those of millions of years." This double recapitulation would still further complicate the educational application of the doctrine.

The ethics of a system is the most convenient touchstone by which to decide whether or not a writer is "naturalistic" in the technical sense.¹ For the naturalist, as opposed to the idealist, conduct is based on impulse, or instinct, or on the experiences acquired through the reaction of environment on the physical endowment of the individual without the intervention of such factors as will and conscience. The ethical doctrine typical of this position is Hedonism, which has as its educational corollary the discipline by natural consequences.

Spencer's position in his chapter on Moral Education is avowedly hedonistic. "From whatever assumption they start, all theories of morality," he contends, "agree that conduct whose total results, immediate or remote, are beneficial, is good conduct; while conduct whose total results, immediate and remote, are injurious, is bad conduct. The ultimate standards by which all men judge of behaviour, are the resulting happiness or misery." According to this doctrine there is no moral law, no place for duty for duty's sake; self-sacrifice would be utter foolishness; one's own selfish satisfaction the greatest good. The moral worth of actions is, on this view, assessed solely by their consequences, whereas Idealism judges actions by their motives. Naturalism,

¹ Cf. W. R. Sorley, *On the Ethics of Naturalism*.

regarding all behaviour from the animal standpoint, takes instinctive activity as typical. Now the distinctive characteristic of instinctive activity is not universality, nor invariability, but unconsciousness of the end to be attained ; there is consequently no other way open to Naturalism of judging action than by results. Consciousness of the aim is characteristic only of human activity ; motives are possible only to man, hence human conduct requires quite other standards than those available to Naturalism.

The means, Spencer counsels, to attain his aim is the discipline by natural consequences—"a most inconclusive argument in favour of moral training by a-moral means." The doctrine of the discipline by natural consequences Spencer explains thus : "When a child falls, or runs its head against the table, it suffers a pain, the remembrance of which tends to make it more careful ; and by repetition of such experiences, it is eventually disciplined into proper guidance of its movements." "Now in these cases, Nature illustrates to us in the simplest way, the true theory and practice of moral discipline." He maintains that it is the peculiarity of these penalties that they are simply the unavoidable consequences of the deeds which they follow ; they are nothing more than the inevitable reactions entailed by the child's actions ; that they are proportionate to

the transgressions ; and that they are also constant, direct, unhesitating, and not to be escaped.

In criticism we may say that Spencer's principle does not apply without exception. He himself later admits that during infancy a considerable amount of absolutism is necessary, and that a three-year-old urchin playing with an open razor cannot be allowed to learn by this discipline of consequences, for the consequences may be too serious. Spencer maintains that the natural reactions are inevitable, but Kant¹ implies that though punishment is a physical evil which ought to be connected with moral evil as a natural consequence, it is not actually so connected. We cannot likewise admit that the natural reactions are proportionate to the transgressions ; Nature's distribution of the penalties is more arbitrary than man's. The doctrine might be justified on the ground that it enables the child to escape the dangers of repression resulting from adult domination, but this can be effected less drastically by the methods of " self-government." The defect of Spencer's doctrine as a whole is that it is mainly negative and prohibitive ; it would never lead to disinterested actions, to noble deeds done for their own sake. Its highest virtue would be selfish prudence. It is an outstanding instance of

¹ *Critique of Practical Reason*, Abbott's English Trans., p. 127.

the fact that Naturalism cannot account for ethical values.

Present-day Naturalism is more comprehensive than the original forms of the doctrine, and consequently approximates more closely to Idealism. This comprehensiveness is characteristic of such a work as Nunn's *Education : Its Data and First Principles*. The writer approaches the educational problem from the scientific or biological standpoint, admitting this when he states that the criterion of educational effort laid down provisionally in the first chapter is justified by a sound reading of biological facts. In accordance with this naturalistic attitude he maintains that life as a whole may with little extravagance be regarded as the unrolling of an instinct ; and in the phenomena of conscious life he sees but the manifestation of properties that permeate all organisms through and through. He accordingly regards the difference between the perceptions of a dog and the thoughts of a sage as a difference not in the nature of the process, but in its range and complexity and in the materials with which it works.

From his biological standpoint Nunn naturally regards "the autonomous development of the individual" as the central aim of education, and insists that the education that aims at fostering individuality is the only education "according to nature." Biologically the development of the

individual is largely determined by the past, and the educationist, writing from the biological standpoint, ignoring largely the influence of the environment and minimising the importance of the curriculum, falls back on instinctive activity, recapitulation, etc., for his principles of explanation. This has led Benjamin Kidd to refer to "biological predestination."¹ Such predestination is further implied in the employment of the term "adaptation," the highest category of animal behaviour. Adaptation is, however, a satisfactory conception only where the environment is an ideal one, or where, as in teaching, the teacher has manipulated and prearranged the environment; but it is a misleading conception for life itself where man's work consists mainly in modifying the material environment to suit his own purposes and in creating a cultural environment to sustain him in his upward progress. Progress is generally the result of conflict, not of adaptation. The "adaptation" view makes permanence, as did the Greeks and the East, the end of education, whereas progress is the dominating conception of modern times and of the West.²

Creative activity and its product, a cultural

¹ *The Science of Power*, p. 267.

² It is interesting to note that idealists generally, e.g. Kant, Fichte, propose to educate not for the present state of society, but for a future better state.

environment, are incompatible with adaptation. They are, however, so essential in a modern theory of education that even at the cost of inconsistency they must be included. Thus Nunn is led to assert that adaptation implies the creative element, and to concede¹ : " In the case of man, at least, the creative character of the psychical activities scarcely needs illustration ; the whole fabric of the civilisation he has built up bears witness to it. Social organisation, laws and government, the arts and sciences, have all sprung from a restless creative power which, even in the dullest of mankind, adds to the world something that would not be there if that power had not been exercised." Nunn nevertheless fails to recognise that this creative capacity is distinctive of man and of God, and cannot, like individuality, be attributed to all organisms.

The naturalist who makes the development of individuality the aim of education is unconvincing when he seeks to account for the social aspects of experience. The biologist is forced to regard the endowment and the environment as alien and external to each other ; he likewise comes to regard the individual and social aspects of experience as exclusive of each other. He tends also to assume that the life of the human soul partakes of the same isolation as that of the animal body. But for Idealism the conflict of indi-

¹ P. 24.

vidualism and socialism is a conflict within man, a conflict between man's lower animal nature and his higher spiritual nature. Man's higher or spiritual nature is essentially social ; as Caird says¹ : " It is through the surrender of himself to social life that man is first lifted above his animal individuality, and thus in a higher sense, gains a consciousness of himself *as* an individual, i.e., as a spiritual being who is a law and an end to himself." It is thus because the social is an expression of man's rational or spiritual—hence, universal—nature,² that the naturalist has difficulty in accounting for it.

The conception of the autonomous development of the individual as the central aim of education is also liable to misinterpretation, and may even be thought to justify mere self-assertion, thus approaching dangerously the ethics of Nietzsche in which the efficient individual acknowledges no authority but his own will and no morality but his own interests, or that expressed by Harold Begbie in the statement³ : " Look where you will, it is the spirit of I Myself which is paramount. Life exists for Me : all the dim æons behind have

¹ *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. ii, p. 610.

² For Kant the moral is the universal. Cf. his first formulation of the moral law : " Act so that the maxim of your act may become a universal law."

³ *The Weakest Link*, p. 43 : quoted by Benjamin Kidd, *The Science of Power*, p. 38. Cf. E. L. Thorndike, *Education : A First Book*, pp. 31-3.

toiled to produce Me: This brief moment in the eternal duration of time is only an opportunity for My pleasure and My ease: I care not a jot for the ages ahead and the sons of men who shall inhabit the earth when I am dust beneath their feet. Give Me My Rights. Stand clear of My way. I want and I will have." And if such a view would ever lead to a religion, it would not be that of renunciation and self-sacrifice.

We cannot then make the autonomous development of the individual the aim of education.¹

¹ The complementary error is evident in those statements which make the enrichment of the life of the nation or of humanity the aim of education, and underlies Dewey's identification of moral conduct with social conduct. Fichte's statement (*Characteristics of the Present Age*, English Trans., p. 33), if taken apart from its context, expresses this error in exaggerated fashion: "There is but One Virtue,—to forget one's own personality; and but One Vice,—to make self the object of our thoughts." For Fichte, however, "That the life of Man be dedicated to that of his Race" is equivalent to "That the Life of Man be dedicated to Ideas" or to "the life according to Reason."

Against this error T. H. Green has protested in his *Prolegomena to Ethics*, §§ 184, 185, maintaining "There can be nothing in a nation however exalted its mission, or in a society however perfectly organised, which is not in the persons composing the nation or the society. Our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of personal worth." While Aristotle regards justice as a social virtue (*Politics*, bk. iii, ch. xiii, cf. bk. i, ch. ii), Plato remarks (*Republic*, § 443) that justice is

The term "individuality" has for educational purposes too wide a denotation or range ; it is also too narrow in connotation ; it neglects certain factors which may be comprehended under "personality." A person, according to Locke, must be conscious, and according to Kant, must be free ; and it is somewhat difficult to ascribe both consciousness and autonomy to everything having individuality. Findlay¹ regards individuality not as an aim but as a datum in Education, and Adams² regards it as a datum in Education, and personality as almost wholly a datum, but still leaving a certain scope for the educator. In his *Modern Developments of Educational Practice* the latter further explains³ :

"There are three terms that are always getting in each other's way in the study of educational questions : *individuality, personality, and character*. The last may be

indeed something of the kind, only that "it has to do with that inward performance of it which truly concerns the man himself, and his own interests." Kant in his third formulation of the moral law holds the balance true : "Always treat humanity both in your own person and in the person of others as an end and never merely as a means."

¹ J. J. Findlay, *The Foundations of Education*, vol. i, p. 22.

² J. Adams, *The Evolution of Educational Theory*, p. 46.

³ Ibid., pp. 113-14. Cf. T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 217: "Social life is to personality what language is to thought."

conveniently marked off from the other two, because it generally carries with it the idea of moral evaluation. When we refer to a man's character, we almost invariably have in the background some sort of estimate of his moral standing. Individuality has a corresponding limitation on the biological side. No doubt the schoolmen spent some centuries in failing to discover the exact nature of individuation, but the biologist has no difficulty, in most cases, in saying precisely what an individual is. For him it is a separate organism existing independently as a self-sufficient unity. To be sure, there are certain borderland cases, notably among the polyzoa, but in the higher ranges of animal life, which alone interests us here, there is no room for doubt. When applied to human beings, however, the term *individuality* carries with it something more than the biological meaning. It is quite common to make an appeal to teachers to respect the individuality of their pupils ; but in this sense the word *personality* would do as well, and in fact is, on the whole, more frequently used. What we must respect in our pupil is not the mere separate existence of the young human animal, but those qualities in him which make him what he is. One is tempted, indeed, to regard personality as the picturesque aspect of individuality. Teachers have to admit that the most commonplace member of their class has individuality, since he is obviously a self-contained unity existing by and for himself. . . . He enjoys his banal self-containedness quite as much as his brilliant fellow enjoys his striking personality ; but the two belong to quite different categories all the same.

“ Of practical importance to the teacher is the fact,

which careful observation of the use of the term will establish, that the term *personality* nearly always implies a reference to the way in which the individual concerned reacts upon other individuals. A man of strong personality is one who has a marked influence upon his fellows."

Individuality may thus be objected to on the ground that it emphasises the differentiating factors, whereas personality recognises the common characteristics of mankind. We have thus to train pupils not only to think for themselves, but also to think like other people. Insistence on development of individuality may result in a condition of affairs, such as Herbart described,¹ in which each person brags of his own individuality and nobody understands his neighbour. Man must be taught to rise above his individuality, and to seek in social activities and social service the satisfaction of his spiritual needs. Thus when we substitute the enrichment of personality for the development of individuality as the aim of education, it is not a mere change of terminology ; it is a fundamental difference in standpoint, reflecting a different philosophy of life. It implies a different view of man's nature, a revaluation of naturalistic values—making knowledge, art, morality and religion the ultimate realities ; a different conception of man's destiny—that man's

¹ *Allegemeine Pädagogik*, bk. ii, ch. iv, § 1.

mission in life is not merely to adapt himself to his environment or even to know it, but to enrich it by his creative activities.

The biological interpretation of man underlies Eugenics. The eugenists contend that the improvement of the human race can best be effected by human, as against "natural" selection, and by the regulation and control of those who should be allowed to bear offspring. Opposed to them is a school of writers who maintain that the progress and improvement of a race can be more rapidly and more effectively influenced by ideas, by the creation of a right public sentiment, and who rely on Education to effect this. The eugenists represent the naturalistic tradition, the others the idealistic. The opposition that thus results between eugenists and educationists is but one form of the Nature versus Nurture controversy, or of the instinctivist or hereditarian versus environmentalist interpretations of human life.

The eugenist tends to discount the importance of Education, but Eugenics and Education are complementary, as Plato clearly realised and definitely stated in the *Republic*¹: "And indeed, if a state has once started well, it exhibits a kind of circular progress in its growth. Adherence to a good system of nurture and education creates good natures, and good natures, receiving the

¹ § 424.

assistance of a good education, grow still better than they were, their breeding qualities improving among the rest, as is also seen in the lower animals."

This complementary aspect, the importance of the environmental and educational influences, is again reasserting itself; the biological and other evidence supporting it has been conveniently marshalled by Swift in *The Psychology of Youth*. He sums up thus¹: "No intelligent person thinks that men are born equal in mental capacity or that the outlook for moral growth gives the same clear view of the future in different children. The present writer frankly accepts the belief that the quality of grey matter which makes the career of a genius possible is not produced during the lifetime of a single individual. Heredity is a tremendous social force. After admitting all this, however, the vital problem is still untouched. The practical question is not what is inherited, but rather what can be realized. Will the brain tissue be utilized to its fullest capacity? Will the 'born genius' always reveal his power? Or to ask a still more practical question, will the average boy and girl actualize his or her possibilities?" The practical consequences of this view are apparent in the announcement² that the first

¹ E. J. Swift, *The Psychology of Youth*, ch. iii, "The Chance of Growth."

² *School and Society*, xxvi, no. 671 (Nov. 5, 1927), p. 584.

of the centres of interest around which the new curriculum at Vassar College is to be organised is that of Euthenics, the term denoting the idea of improving the individual through improving his environment.

The wider view which includes the environmental and educational influences was prominent in the writings and educational schemes of Robert Owen more than a century ago. His fundamental principle was that any character, from the best to the worst, from the most ignorant to the most enlightened, may be given to any community, even to the world at large, by the application of proper means ; which means are under the control of those who have influence in the affairs of men.¹ Children, he explains,² can be trained to acquire any language, sentiments, belief, or any bodily habits and manners, not contrary to human nature. His principle was for long misunderstood, as it was falsely assumed that it applied to the individual, and that the individual's character could be fashioned quite irrespective of his hereditary endowment. But Owen in his principle refers to "the community" and consistently qualifies his statements by introducing the term

¹ Robert Owen, *A New View of Society : or, Essays on the Formation of Human Character*, 4th edition, 1818, p. 11.

² Ibid., p. 12, cf. p. 26 ; also G. D. H. Cole, *Robert Owen*, p. 100.

"collectively," thus affirming that the old collectively may train the young collectively to be ignorant and miserable, or to be intelligent and happy, and repeating that children collectively may be taught any sentiments and habits. So strenuously, indeed, did he contend for this view that his doctrine amounts almost to determinism, and doubtless on this account excited the suspicion and evoked the opposition of those who on theological grounds maintained the freedom of the will.

The eugenic doctrine admittedly received its stimulus and derived its support from Darwin's evolutionary hypothesis ; it is not, however, based on natural selection, which would lead in the case of human society only to a *laissez-faire* policy ; rather is it based on the manifest improvement resulting from the application of human skill and control in the breeding of animals. The improvement here is not necessarily an improvement from the animals' standpoint but merely an improvement to suit a man-made environment and to satisfy human needs. The process is throughout directed by a conscious purpose, and until there is some agreement as to what human ends are desirable the analogy of the breeding of animals cannot be applied to human beings. Fitness and unfitness are relative terms, relative to ends, and the realm of ends is the sphere of



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philosophy, not of science. For the lack of a sound philosophy Eugenics, like Education, falls into contradictions and inconsistencies ; thus, if army standards were adopted, many prominent advocates of Eugenics would doubtless be relegated to the C₃ category, and the utterances of certain eugenists would lead us to infer that unfitness consists merely in a difference of race, of social class, of educational opportunity, or even of religion.

The problem of hereditary transmission has been enormously complicated by the Mendelian theory of unit characters ; the eugenists have also to decide whether individual integration or social integration is to be the deciding factor. It is on this latter point that Benjamin Kidd in his work *The Science of Power* has joined issue with the eugenists. He has pertinently asked¹ :

“ Have the interpreters of Darwinism in the past missed the great secret of the humanity of the world ? It is becoming evident that all the truth there is in Darwin’s great conception may be summed up in a single word—integration. For long we have wasted our breath in talk about the survival of the fittest and in discussions as to which the fittest may be. But the fittest in life is simply the most advanced integration. Darwinism dealt with the individual, and with the individual mostly before the advent of mind. The law of the integration

¹ P. 40.

of the individual has become the law of the supremacy and of the omnipotence of brute force. But other and higher integrations are now on foot in the world which rest on mind and spirit. It is the laws and the meanings of these integrations which are carrying the world into new horizons. And in the upbuilding of the civilization founded on this wider knowledge it is the stones which the builders of the past have rejected which are about to become the master stones of the edifice."

Eugenics cannot compare with Education in regard to the rate of social improvement. Ideas are not inherited, but acquired, and herein lies the educator's opportunity. Owen pointed out that children may be made to believe and declare that conduct to be right and virtuous, and to die in its defence, which their parents had been taught to believe and say was wrong and vicious, and to oppose which those parents would also have willingly sacrificed their lives. Kidd contends that under the influence of the emotion of the ideal the outlook of a people can be changed in a generation, instancing in support of his contention the development of the Japanese people, who within the space of less than two generations passed through the whole interval which separates feudalism from modern conditions. And he concludes triumphantly¹ :

"The will to attain to an end imposed on a people by the emotion of an ideal organised and transmitted through

¹ P. 298. T. H. SHILLAY
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social heredity is the highest capacity of mind. It can only be imposed in all its strength through the young. So to impose it has become the chief end of education in the future.

“ Oh, you blind leaders who seek to convert the world by laboured disputation ! Step out of the way or the world must fling you aside. Give us the Young. Give us the Young and we will create a new mind and a new earth in a single generation.”

When Eugenics is in a position to return unequivocal answers to its questions,¹ it will have to seek the assistance of Education for their dissemination and general acceptance² ; at present it is antagonising educationists, and tending to arrest the efforts of social reformers, doubtless the consequences of a naturalistic bias in whatever philosophy it has chanced to inherit.

The naturalistic interpretation of human life has likewise dominated, and thereby prejudiced, much recent educational psychology. The great activity characteristic of American education has resulted from a philosophy and a psychology the

¹ The only valid conclusion which Eugenics may be said to have arrived at is that mental deficient should be segregated and prevented from bearing offspring, a conclusion which educationists would readily accept. The difficulty of having this conclusion put into force proves the dependence of Eugenics on Education.

² Cf. R. M. Yerkes, *Journal of Delinquency*, vol. i, No. 5 (Nov. 1916), “ Educational and Psychological Aspects of Racial Well-Being.”

liimitations of which are only now revealing themselves. The psychology is derived from Thorndike ; it can hardly be said to be Thorndike's own,¹ for he notes the presence of, and seeks to do justice to, all the functions of mental life, including man's ideals.² To Thorndike is due the credit of rescuing educational psychology from the lecture-room and students' note-book and giving it a method which has proved wonderfully fruitful. The old *a priori* psychology did not function. But the American psychology works, and up to a point has signally served the cause of Education. It is now, one fears, a spent force, because the philosophy—if such it can be called—behind it is naturalistic. It presupposes a purely mechanistic view of life ; meeting a situation is its highest ideal, and a chance success its ultimate explanation. Its analogies it derives from the responses of the lower animals in quite artificial situations,³ and its principles are Thorndike's laws of learning reduced to their lowest terms. The result is merely a discipline by natural consequences

¹ Although it is criticised as such by B. H. Bode, *Modern Educational Theories*, pp. 178-91.

² *Educational Psychology*, vol. i, pp. 310-12.

³ The inferences derived from the results of investigations on the trial-and-error methods of learning in the case of animals require revision in the light of the "Gestalt" doctrine. Cf. K. Koffka, *The Growth of the Mind*, English Trans., ch. iv.

expressed in psychological terms. It is the psychology which Kilpatrick¹ has adopted to support his project method, and is well suited for this purpose. But it is a psychology that can find no place for the creative activity of the human mind ; no place even for the "insight" which Köhler's chimpanzees displayed when confronted with a difficult situation ; on the educational side no place for culture, for knowledge for its own sake, that is, for the products of such creative activity.

Behaviourism may explain how an animal meets a situation, but man can create a situation ; and this is beyond the scope of a behaviourist psychology to explain. It may account for the *behaviour* of animals, but not for the *conduct* of man, which is determined by motives, ideals and the future. Even if man had at his disposal only the same number and type of responses as the animals, the presence of a new directive force would transmute these out of all recognition and thus invalidate the analogies drawn from animal reactions. The problems which the animal can attack are restricted to perceptual experience ; the animal cannot appreciate a theoretical problem ; it cannot likewise justify its mode of behaviour or solution of a problem, if that should be called in question, for this involves reasoning rather than thinking, and a

¹ W. H. Kilpatrick, *Foundations of Method*, ch. ii.

psychology that cannot comprehend reasoning is of little value to the educator. The training of animals and the education of children are indeed quite different processes.

Looking at the subject from a political rather than from a philosophical standpoint, Bagley sees in the results of Mental Testing and in some of the conclusions drawn from these results a fatalistic tendency, an educational determinism, which challenges the democratic conception in Education, and which, in our view, is merely a further expression of the naturalistic philosophy ; "the current teachings of the determinist school are dangerous," affirms Bagley,¹ "because they proceed with an apparently dogmatic disregard of the possibilities of insuring progress through environmental agencies."

The old issue—heredity versus environment—is raised anew, as Bagley recognises, by the results of mental testing, and he dreads and challenges the mass of appealing and plausible evidence drawn to the support of the hereditarian hypothesis ; "the clear tendency of educational determinism," he suggests,² "is to leave us with a negative philosophy of education,—a collection of statements regarding those things that the school simply cannot do." The fallacy of the determinist he traces to the same source as that already indicated as the weakness of the natural-

¹ W. C. Bagley, *Determinism in Education*, p. 39. ² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

istic position, namely, neglect of the higher factors in human life. He expresses it thus¹:

“A great mistake of the determinist has been to confine his thinking to organic evolution ; he thinks only of the forces and factors that governed progress from the dawn of life to the dawn of mind. He forgets that, with the dawn of mind, new forces were let loose which transformed the entire character and course of progress. He forgets that, with the dawn of language, still other forces were let loose,—for from that time on the common man could share the thoughts and feelings of the most gifted of his immediate fellows. He forgets how this great force of common experience was immeasurably broadened and strengthened by the art of writing and the art of printing which made it possible for the common man not only to enter into the experience of his immediate fellows, but almost literally to stand upon the shoulders of all the tall and sun-crowned men who had gone before. He is forgetting that the development of the universal school is the latest scene in this great drama of social evolution.”

Bagley concedes that the fatalistic attitude is not the only conclusion of the activities of mental testing. “For everything that is positive and constructive in its teaching there will always be a warm welcome. For whatever it has to present that is negative and destructive it must clearly assume the burden of proof,” he claims,² and repeats,³ “My quarrel is not with the tests,

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

but with the fatalistic assumptions which are part of their 'heredity.'

Although Education in Britain has a definite naturalistic background, the testing movement has on the whole been positive and constructive. It may at the outset have suffered from the fallacy of mal-observation ; we may have been finding only what we were seeking, namely, deficiency, but the orientation has now quite changed and the tests are being extensively employed for the discovery of ability. Starting with mental deficiency, the aim of intelligence testing was not to stigmatise certain children as M.D.s, but rather to prove the necessity for, and direct these children to, a type of education from which they might derive some benefit.¹ In the case of children of low intelligence, the backward, it has led, not to a fatalistic attitude towards such pupils, which has indeed been the traditional attitude of the school, but to a condemnation of the abstract type of education from which they were gaining nothing ; it has evoked a plea for an "extensive"


¹ The positive aspect was recognised in the Defective and Epileptic Act of 1899 which defined mentally defective children as " those children who not being imbecile and not being merely dull and backward are defective, and that is to say, by reason of mental (or physical) defect are incapable of receiving proper benefit from the instruction in ordinary public elementary schools but are not incapable by reason of such defect of receiving benefit in such special classes or schools as are in this Act mentioned."

rather than an "intensive" type of education, a proposal on which, merely generalised, Bagley bases his hope of democracy.¹ It is, however, in the discovery of unsuspected ability that the tests have proved most fruitful. The Northumberland Tests² and tests applied by the present writer in Fifeshire³ revealed ability quite un-

¹ In his *Determinism in Education*, p. 13, Bagley has misrepresented the writer's position. According to the official report of the lecture to which Bagley makes reference—*The London Child-Study Society Year Book*, 1921: "The Supernormal Child"—the writer, referring to the backward, said, "Their education should be of an extensive rather than of an intensive type; they should be made acquainted with a wider range of facts rather than be urged to apply arrested intelligences to aspects of subjects beyond their mental grasp."

² G. H. Thomson, *British Journal of Psychology*, vol. xii (Dec. 1921), pp. 201-22.

³ *The Scottish Educational Journal*, vol. v, No. 50 (Dec. 15, 1922); also *Times Educational Supplement*, June 23, 1923. The results secured may be represented thus :



The numbers in the respective quadrants indicate—

469 pupils making 0-50 in Scholastic Tests				0-50 in Intelligence Tests			
228	"	"	50-100	"	"	"	0-50
217	"	"	0-50	"	"	"	50-100
489	"	"	50-100	"	"	"	50-100

recognised by traditional scholastic examinations, and opened the door of secondary education to children hitherto denied it—surely a democratic proceeding. The extension of mental tests to include "performance" tests has disclosed a type of ability ignored by the schools and also by the original "intelligence" tests, and reinforced the demand for an extension of the range of school activities and the inclusion of more practical work. The "temperament" tests and special disability tests are bringing hope to many misunderstood pupils, for they are enabling us to diagnose inhibitions and defects which are in many cases curable, and which will enable the child not only to make intellectual progress but also to regain his self-respect by freeing him from inferiority complexes and social disabilities.

At first sight the conclusions of mental testing seemed to support a stereotyped, and consequently, according to Bode,¹ an aristocratic type of social

Bagley would point to the 228 pupils to prove what education can do for those of low intelligence. The writer would point to the 217 to prove the failure of education in the case of pupils of high ability. The positions are complementary. Bagley usually implies that the correlation is always high.

¹ Bode's main thesis in his *Modern Educational Theories* is that a stereotyped society and an aristocratic society are synonymous.

organisation. Burt¹ found a higher average level of attainment with the children of the Oxford dons than in the case of children of the Oxford tradespeople, but the fact has to be kept in mind to which Marshall in his *Principles of Economics*² has directed attention, that while relatively the industrial classes may not stand so high in ability, absolutely their children of ability must far outnumber the superior children of the professional classes. "The laws which govern the birth of genius," says Marshall, "are inscrutable. It is probable that the percentage of children of the working classes who are endowed with natural abilities of the highest order is not so great as that of the children of people who have attained or have inherited a higher position in society. But since the manual labour classes are four or five times as numerous as all the other classes put together, it is not unlikely that more than half the best natural genius that is born into the country belongs to them; and of this a great part is fruitless for want of opportunity. There is no extravagance more prejudicial to the growth of national wealth than that wasteful negligence which allows genius that happens to be born of lowly parentage to expend itself in lowly

¹ C. Burt, *British Journal of Psychology*, vol. iii (Dec. 1909), pp. 94-177: "Experimental Tests of General Intelligence."

² *Principles of Economics*, pp. 212-13, note.

work." The more general adoption by Education Authorities of mental testing will enlarge the scope of selection and hasten the discovery of such ability.

It is undoubtedly the case that the mental-testing movement at the outset emphasised the innate factor in the intelligence tested to the almost total neglect of the acquired factor, but various studies have helped to correct this error,¹ for which the originators of the tests were not to blame, as they insisted that the tests were only valid for children moving in a normal environment. Ability only can be tested, not innate capacity, and ability is compounded of innate capacity together with the interaction on, or commerce of, innate capacity with environment. Education is just another term for such commerce or interaction, and it is the function of education to turn capacity into ability. Education should consequently present to all the children of all the people as rich and varied an educational fare as possible.

We are grateful to Bagley for directing attention to the fatalistic tendency in the conclusions of mental testing and for opening a new chapter in the philosophy of testing ; such fatalism is not, however, inherent in mental testing but is a consequence of the inadequate and unsatisfactory

¹ H. Gordon, *Mental and Scholastic Tests among Retarded Children*, Board of Education, Educational Pamphlets, No. 44.

philosophical background which lies behind the testing, a recent development of the naturalistic metaphysics against which we have throughout this chapter been protesting.

Naturalism, we may conclude, looks to the past for the cause and explanation of human activity, is content to take things as it finds them and to make the best of them, emphasises individual assertion as against social co-operation, makes for a stereotyped instead of a progressive conception of society. In Education it fails to develop respect for conscience and to encourage responsibility for social well-being ; it regards man's highest aspirations as illusions ; and it subverts the confidence that arises from the feelings that man in his noblest efforts is co-operating with the Divine.

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CHAPTER IV

PRAGMATISM IN EDUCATION

Relation of speculative to practical activity—Pragmatism modern and Anglo-Saxon—explanation of term—a protest against impersonal interpretation of existence by Naturalism—attack on science develops into attack on intellect—extended to Intellectualism in Philosophy—criticism of both Naturalism and Idealism as monistic. Pragmatism and Idealism agree in emphasising importance of personality—Pragmatism takes exclusive view, Idealism the universal view. Pragmatic view leans to emphasis on feeling and emotion, but these cannot explain science, philosophy or religion. Pragmatism subordinates thinking to doing—basis of project method—relation of project to other educational methods—subordination of truth to practice invalid—fails to develop interest in knowledge for its own sake, to explain morality, art. Complementary view.

THE Greeks discussed the question as to the relative values of the speculative and the practical lives, and Aristotle had not the slightest hesitation in awarding the superiority to the speculative life on the ground that the speculative activity is the only one that is prized for its own sake. The modern pragmatist inverts the Greek conclusion, and with as little hesitation as Aristotle contends that the true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good,¹ that is, the truth or validity of a principle or belief depends upon its effect on

¹ W. James, *Pragmatism*, p. 76.

practice ; the pragmatist thus subordinates speculative to practical activity.

The pragmatic attitude is modern and typically English or Anglo-Saxon. The germ of the utilitarian or pragmatic spirit is to be traced to Bacon's introduction of the view that knowledge was to be sought for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man's estate ; his aim was to establish a trustworthy system whereby nature might be interpreted and brought into the service of man.¹ Locke in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* adopts what is practically the pragmatic standpoint ; in Book I he affirms, "we shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us," and in the Introduction, "our business is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct." Fraser, in a footnote, commenting on this latter statement, remarks² that this might be the motto of the *Essay*, and the watchword of English philosophy which characteristically seeks to keep in direct relation to life and conduct.

The history of the term itself is given by Prof. James in his work entitled *Pragmatism*³ as follows :

¹ Bacon nevertheless recognised the limitations of the pragmatical position. Cf. *Of the Advancement of Learning*, popular edition of Bacon's works, pp. 76, 155. In the latter passage he refers to "pragmatical men."

² A. C. Fraser, *Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, vol. i, p. 31.

³ Pp. 46-7.

“ The term is derived from the same Greek word *πράγμα*, meaning action, from which our words ‘ practice ’ and ‘ practical ’ come. It was first introduced into philosophy by Mr. Charles Peirce in 1878. In an article entitled ‘ How to Make Our Ideas Clear,’ in the ‘ Popular Science’ Monthly ’ for January of that year, Mr. Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that, to develop a thought’s meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance, and the tangible fact at the root of all our thought-distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.”

Further on James adds¹ :

“ There is absolutely nothing new in the pragmatic method. Socrates was an adept at it. Aristotle used it methodically. Locke, Berkeley and Hume made

¹ P. 50. Cf. F. C. S. Schiller in *Humanism*, Preface : “ I would not disclaim affinities with the great saying of Protagoras, that *Man is the measure of all things.*” T. Gomperz (*Greek Thinkers*, vol. i, p. 453) maintains that the sentence has a generic and not an individual significance. Schiller takes the individualistic interpretation, and justifies it in *Studies in Humanism*, pp. 22-70.

momentous contributions to truth by its means. Shadsworth Hodgson keeps insisting that realities are only what they are 'known as.' But these forerunners of pragmatism used it in fragments ; they were preluders only. Not until in our own time has it generalized itself, become conscious of a universal mission, pretended to a conquering destiny."

Pragmatism is a protest against both Naturalism and Absolute or Hegelian Idealism. Naturalism, doubtless somewhat inconsistently, assumes the universality and objective validity of scientific judgments, while regarding moral and æsthetic values as relative to human ends. Pragmatism applies the same criticism to "the true" that Naturalism does to "the good" ; each of these values is regarded by the contestants of the opposite school as merely an evolutionary product, as relative and personal. In this respect Pragmatism and Naturalism are mutually destructive. As a consequence of this criticism Pragmatism either denies the existence of all absolute values or makes one value—"the good"—absolute. Dewey adopts the latter position. "Some goods," he says,¹ "are not good for anything ; they are just goods. Any other notion leads to an absurdity. For we cannot stop asking the question about an instrumental good, one

¹ *Democracy and Education*, p. 283.

whose value lies in its being good *for* something, unless there is at some point something intrinsically good, good for itself." Schiller in *Humanism*¹ maintains that at a blow Pragmatism awards to the ethical conception of *Good* supreme authority over the logical conception of *True* and the metaphysical conception of *Real*; in his *Studies in Humanism*² he qualifies this somewhat by defining truth as logical value, putting it on an equality with other values like Goodness, Beauty and Happiness, and regarding them as "commingled with each other in a fusion one and indiscernible."

The chief complaint of Pragmatism is, however, against the impersonal, mechanistic interpretation of reality resulting from Naturalism; the indifference of science to human hopes and efforts is intolerable to the pragmatist. He consequently puts forward a view of truth which, as a protection against Naturalism, represents it as an integral part "of the purposive reaction upon the universe which bestows dignity and grandeur upon the struggle of human life."³ For the category of causality which rules in science, he would substitute 'human purpose' as the dominating conception in the interpre-

¹ P. 9.

² P. 159.

³ *Studies in Humanism*, p. 158.

tation of experience. This led to the adoption of the title *Humanism*¹ by the English pragmatists.

Idealism agrees with Pragmatism in seeking an escape from "the paralysing horror of the naturalistic view of life, the nightmare of an indifferent universe," but it adopts a different course. It accepts without question the validity of the methods and conclusions of science, but points to the incompleteness of the scientific sphere, whereas (Pragmatism not only questions the universality of scientific judgments but also seeks to discredit the means by which they have been secured, and is thereby itself led to the adoption of the methods of Naturalism.) All idealists would second James's declaration that we have a right to believe the physical to be only a partial order, that we have a right to supplement it by an unseen spiritual order,² but most of them would seek sounder reasons for their belief than those offered by James, who explains that we must take it "on trust," as the spiritual order is one "we have no organ for appre-

¹ The term "Humanism" was doubtless first employed in this sense by A. S. Pringle-Pattison in *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, Preface. In *Humanism* (p. 8) Schiller seeks to distinguish between "Pragmatism" and "Humanism," but in *Studies in Humanism* (p. 5, note) he retracts this.

² *Will to Believe*, p. 53.

hending," and of which consequently "we can frame no positive idea."

To discount the conclusions of science Pragmatism seeks to discredit the mental powers, especially the intellect, by which these conclusions have been attained. Thus we are assured by James¹ that "hardly a law has been established in science, hardly a fact ascertained, which was not first sought after, often with sweat and blood, to gratify an inner need. Whence such needs come from we do not know ; we find them in us, and biological psychology so far only classes them with Darwin's 'accidental variations'" ; and Schiller repeats² : "I cannot but conceive the reason as being like the rest of our equipment, a weapon in the struggle for existence and a means of achieving adaptation. It must follow that the practical use, which has developed it, must have stamped itself upon its inmost structure, even if it had not moulded it out of pre-rational instincts. In short, a reason which has not practical value for the purposes of life is a monstrosity, a morbid aberration or failure of adaptation, which natural selection must sooner or later wipe away." Deprived of reason and intellect as principles of explanation, we are referred to such terms as "practical needs," "efforts of faith," "acts of choice," "subjective passions,"

¹ *Will to Believe*, p. 55.

² *Humanism*, pp. 7-8.

“emotional postulates,” “guesses which I cannot help making.”¹

The attack directed against science for its dependence on the intellect is extended to Hegelian or Absolute Idealism by reason of its too intellectualistic interpretation of reality. The pragmatist, by contrast, “turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad *a priori* reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power”; he likewise demands a universe with “real possibilities, real indeterminations, real beginnings, real ends, real evil, real crises, catastrophes, and escapes, a real God, and a real moral life, just as common-sense conceives these things.”² Many modern idealists would nevertheless agree with Pragmatism in regarding reality as dynamic rather than static, as plastic and capable of development rather than rigid. “For naturalism,” James says,³ “reality is ready-made and complete from all eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the making, and awaits part of its complexion from the future.” Schiller likewise says⁴: “Reality is still in the making.

¹ *Pragmatism*, p. 57.

² *The Will to Believe*, Preface.

³ *Pragmatism*, p. 257.

⁴ *Studies in Humanism*, pp. 218-19. Cf. also pp. 185-6.

Nothing is *absolutely* settled. Human operations are real experiments with a reality that really responds. Thus it is our duty and our privilege to co-operate in the shaping of the world." [If Absolute Idealism reduced man's mental activity to mere contemplation of a completely perfect reality, or to a mere reading of the riddle of the universe without any reaction upon it, it would not long remain an effective force; but even Bosanquet,¹ who argues that the formation of a new reality seems to be a contradiction in terms, admits that when we discover, although we neither add to the universe nor repeat it, we play our part in its self-maintenance, and he contends that it is well to vindicate for the individual mind a living share in the self-maintenance of Reality.] Eucken would go further; he too believes that not only does human effort count, but that it enriches reality, that theories are not mere interpretations of reality but products of the creative activity of man, positive enrichments of reality. Through the discovery of a great truth the man of genius enlarges the boundaries of the spiritual realm just as the explorer by his discoveries adds a new land to our geographical world. "Creative thinkers," as he remarks,² "are parents in the spiritual

¹ *Logic*, vol. ii, pp. 249, 275.

² R. Eucken, *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, English Trans., p. 87.

world." In striving after the truth, in realising the beautiful, and in battling for the right, man is not, however, merely seeking his own individual satisfaction, as Pragmatism suggests ; he is co-operating with the Divine, and the universe is the richer for his efforts.

Pragmatism also joins issue with Naturalism and Idealism in so far as both the latter are monistic, seeking to explain nature, man and God by reduction to a single principle—Naturalism to life, Idealism to mind or spirit. Pragmatism regards this way of conceiving the universe as singularly unimaginative and lacking in variety.¹ It sees no necessity for seeking one fundamental principle of explanation ; it is quite content to admit several principles, and is accordingly pluralistic, but in doing so, it abandons philosophical inquiry and reverts to the common-sense attitude to ultimate issues.

For what the modern idealist is prepared to accept in the contributions of Pragmatism, he has to give other and sounder reasons. That the idealistic attitude to life is more satisfying than the naturalistic, both the idealist and the pragmatist would agree, but the idealist seeks the source of such satisfaction in something deeper than mere practical convenience ; he analyses this satisfaction and finds it to consist in a more com-

¹ Cf. *Studies in Humanism*, p. 218.

prehensive scheme of reality than that admitted by Naturalism, and in principles in this extended reality, principles or standards like the "ought" of morality and the "truth" of knowledge which have in their own sphere the same necessity and universality as causality has in the sphere of natural science, but for which Pragmatism can find no place because of its depreciation of the intellect and reason; in "the truth" and "the right" reason, lifting itself as it were above itself, touches the chords of a higher reality.

In emphasising the importance of human personality the idealist can go all the way with the pragmatist, but they must needs part company when the latter takes the naturalistic or exclusive view of personality. "Man as rational, and in virtue of self-conscious reason the free shaper of his own destiny, furnishes us," says Pringle-Pattison,¹ "with our only indefeasible standard of value, and our clearest light as to the nature of the divine. He does what science, occupied only with the laws of events, and speculative metaphysics, when it surrenders itself to the exclusive guidance of the intellect, alike find unintelligible and are fain to pronounce impossible—he acts. As Goethe puts it in a seeming paradox, Man alone achieves the impossible. But inexplicable in a

¹ *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, Intro.

sense as man's personal agency is—nay, the one perpetual miracle—it is nevertheless our surest datum and our only clue to the mystery of existence.” On human personality, then, must we take our stand in interpreting the world, for “the only form of thing that we directly encounter, the only experience that we concretely have, is our own personal life. The only complete category of our thinking is the category of personality, every other category being but one of the abstract elements of that.”¹ Schiller agrees² that in our final attitude towards life our whole personality must be concerned, and should be the decisive factor in the adoption of a metaphysic. And, anticipating the conclusions of Psycho-analysis, but expressing them more elegantly, James avers³ : “As through the cracks and crannies of caverns those waters exude from the earth's bosom which then form the fountain-heads of springs, so in these crepuscular depths of personality the sources of all our outer deeds and decisions take their rise. Here is our deepest organ of communication with the nature of things; and compared with these concrete movements of our soul all abstract statements and scientific arguments . . . sound to us like mere chatterings of the teeth.”

Since the adoption of the whole personality

¹ *The Will to Believe*, p. 327.

² *Personal Idealism*, pp. 50, 53. ³ *The Will to Believe*, p. 62.

as the standard of philosophical thinking fails to distinguish "personal idealism," or pragmatism, from what Bosanquet suggests we should call "objective idealism," the difference must be sought in the conception of personality itself. If there is one term that would fitly characterise the conception of personality adopted by personal idealism, it is the term "exclusiveness." "Each self," we are told,¹ "is a unique existence, which is perfectly *impervious* to other selves—impervious in a fashion to which the impenetrability of matter is a faint analogue. The self accordingly resists invasion . . . for the very characteristic of a self is this exclusiveness. So far from a principle of union, the self is in truth the very apex of separation and differentiation." The same writer declares that every man's being is different for himself from what it is exhibited to others, and James asserts that in every being that is real there is something external to and sacred from the grasp of every other.² Even God is excluded from these sacred precincts : "I have a centre of my own—a will of my own—which no one shares with me, nor can share—a centre which I maintain even in my dealings with God Himself."³

From this view of personality it follows that

¹ A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 216.

² *The Will to Believe*, p. 141.

³ *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 217.

emphasis must be laid on feeling and emotion, the essential characteristic of which is their particularity, their inwardness, and intellect must be subordinated to feeling and will. But feeling and emotion cannot account for science, a whole technique having been devised to eliminate just this personal equation and render the results of scientific investigation universal and objective. As little can it construct or criticise a metaphysic. Feeling, we are assured,¹ is the deeper source of religion, but the religious appeal is to the whole of man's nature, including the social aspect; it is the solitary religionist that tends to develop abnormality, and the "Varieties of Religious Experience" which James presents in the work under that title² are all of the abnormal type; only in a footnote, as one critic pointed out, could he find a place for Jesus Christ. The present tendency of our educative process towards the æsthetic, the emotional, the intuitive—the tendency to overweigh the scales against the mere dry intelligence, to which a speaker at a recent educational conference referred,³ is no doubt allied to this

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 431.

² A typist erroneously, but aptly, rendered this title "Vagaries" of *Religious Experience*.

³ Mr. Geo. Smith, the Master of Dulwich College, in his Presidential Address to the Annual Meeting of the Incorporated Association of Head Masters at the Guildhall, London, on January 3rd, 1928.

aspect of pragmatic philosophy which makes the emotions directive as well as dynamic, and which leads people, as he said, to mistake the beating of their hearts for the working of their brains.

The idealist's objection to the pragmatist's insistence on personality is that the latter ignores the universal aspects of the human mind ; in spite of his protestations he does not bestow sufficient dignity and grandeur upon human life. The "purpose" on which he relies to explain reality is human purpose, but individual purposes are apt to be cross-purposes, whereas the idealist assumes that through all human activities one increasing purpose runs. The thinking to which the pragmatist refers is actual human thinking which is always personal and individual, the truth is human truth. But the thinking that leads to truth is universal, the same for all of us. And because it is universal, it is objective ; it holds of reality. There is a pre-established harmony between such thinking and reality, a wider adaptation¹ of the one to the other than can be comprehended by Pragmatism. It accords with the correspondence view of cognition and reality, and it satisfies the pragmatic test—it works. But it works because it is universal, whereas the pragmatist can only explain the difference between

¹ Cf. B. Bosanquet, *Logic*, vol. ii, p. 239.

psychological assurance and logical proof by saying that it "lies in the greater psychological communicability of the 'logical' assurances and their wider range of influences."¹ Social endorsement, as Bosanquet has pointed out,² while it may apply roughly to habits of action, has no application to cognitive ideas and theories; it follows verification, and does not create it, otherwise there would be but little hope for such a theory as that of Einstein. The pragmatist's view of reason is likewise far from complimentary to human personality; instead of being the source of man's moral ideals and cultural products it is reduced merely to a power to perceive when better adjustments can be effected by varying our habits of reaction, and no incongruity consequently arises in attributing to the higher animals a mental constitution very like our own,³ a view reminiscent of Naturalism.

The aspect of Pragmatism which has exerted most influence on Education is the subordination of thinking to practice. In the pragmatic conception, we are told,⁴ knowing is the prelude to doing, thought is secondary to action. Cognition in itself is incomplete until discharged in act.

¹ F. C. S. Schiller, *Studies in Humanism*, p. 368.

² *Logic*, vol. ii, p. 245.

³ Cf. *Studies in Humanism*, pp. 409-13.

⁴ *Studies in Humanism*, pp. 400, 408.

"From its first dawn to its highest actual attainment we find that the cognitive faculty, where it appears to exist at all, appears but as one element in an organic mental whole, and as a minister to higher mental powers—the powers of will."¹ This criticism of the intellect and of thought derives its force from the assumption that the intellect is an independent faculty of the mind, a view against which psychology has long contended, but which underlies formal logic and accounts for the unfruitfulness of the latter. In presenting a genetic account of the development of truth² and in showing the intimate relation in which thought and action stand to each other Pragmatism has provided a stimulus to the study of thinking from the practical standpoint, and one has only to compare Dewey's *How We Think* with the treatment of thought in the formal logic text-books to realise the significance of the change. What educationists have of late been demanding is a modern *Conduct of the Understanding*.³ This aspect is not, however, quite pragmatic; it deals with the making of truth, rather than with

¹ *The Will to Believe*, p. 140.

² For "Limits of a Genetic Theory of Logic," see B. Bosanquet, *Logic*, vol. ii, ch. vii.

³ The title used by Locke. Graham Wallas's *The Art of Thought* is a recent example of the type of work on thinking that is of value for the teacher. Adams has in his *Errors in School* equated this to the level of the schoolroom.

its application, and is the aspect in which Schiller, in his *Studies in Humanism*, appears to be the more interested.¹ The idealist can accept this contribution of Pragmatism, because he has never held the view of thought attributed to him by the pragmatist ; in fact, the pragmatist when he believes he is criticising idealism, is really attacking rationalism, as Schiller in places is candid enough to confess. Thus an objective idealist like Bosanquet can write² : " It is well to vindicate for Logic the sphere of Life and practice as against an imaginary heaven of ideas—to which, however, no master of thought has relegated it."

Without committing himself to the ultimate subordination of the theoretic to the practical reason the idealist welcomes the pragmatic method, as the term is applied in Education, in so far as it emphasises the insufficiency of merely theoretical exposition and the necessity for the pupil working out the practical application of a principle. That the pupil should be aware of, and appreciate, the method by which a truth is discovered or a principle established has been insisted on by the inductive and heuristic methods of teaching ; the pragmatic method insists on the complementary aspect, namely, that for the pupil's full understanding of a principle he should see it in its application to facts, he should

¹ Ch. vii.


² *Logic*, vol. ii, p. 275.

see it actually "tried out." The "purposeful act" comprises both aspects in its four steps: purposing, planning, executing, judging¹; both might even be said to have been comprised in the "Preparation" and the "Application" stages of the old Herbartian lesson plan.²

A useful illustration of the pragmatic method is provided by Kilpatrick³: "I don't punctuate—or I shouldn't—merely to use, repeat, illustrate some rules on punctuation. Some people do; they are mere pedants. I say to myself, 'I wish my readers to think thus and so. If I use a comma here will they more likely think this or not? I punctuate then pragmatically, to affect my

¹ W. H. Kilpatrick, *Foundations of Method*, pp. 203-16.

² The various teaching methods can be related to one another, and expressed thus:



The "purposeful act" in the Project Method:

Purpose | Plan | ←→ | Execute | Judge

The steps in the Herbartian Lesson Plan:

Preparation | Presentation | Generalisation | Application.

The Herbartian Method differs from the Project Method in being a method of teaching, not of learning, and in applying to knowledge, not to skill.

³ *Foundations of Method*, p. 229.

readers and to effect in them certain desired thoughts, to make them think the things I wish'—and that gives you a practical criterion with which to judge the success of your punctuation." Just as some people dress for effect, so Kilpatrick punctuates for effect. Writers used to, and many school pupils still do, spell for effect, but it has been found advisable for all to spell according to rule. The pragmatist seems to imply that the only alternative to employing the pragmatic method is to follow a rule blindly, but there is also the possibility of applying a rule intelligently. A rule in intellectual work is equivalent to a habit in the acquisition of skill; it economises time and effort. The pragmatic method makes all learning incidental; it fails to provide the practice in a dexterity which is necessary to make it automatic; it likewise would not lead to that logical organisation of knowledge which is ultimately its most economical form.¹ Just as Naturalism fails because it regards the world of science as the complete reality, so Pragmatism fails because it regards the world of practice as the complete reality. James says of the pragmatic method that it tries to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequence, but there may also be purely theoretical consequences

¹ For plea for logical organisation in knowledge see B. H. Bode, *Modern Educational Theories*, ch. iii.

which the pragmatist ignores. Thought may be incomplete until discharged in act, but action may indeed subserve some theoretical end. The incompleteness resulting from the subordination of the intellect to the will has both philosophical and educational consequences.

The instrumental view of thinking implied in this subordination of intellect to will, which Dewey has championed, has much in its favour; it can cite in its support the importance of the "Aufgabe" in the experiments on the psychology of thinking initiated by H. J. Watt and K. Bühler.¹ In Education it has provided pupils with real incentives to learning: "A certain discipline of the reasoning powers can be acquired through lessons in science and mathematics; but, after all, this is somewhat remote and shadowy compared with the training of attention and judgment that is acquired in having to do things with a real motive behind and a real outcome ahead."² But, we must ask, is this instrumental function the sole function of thought? Must reason always, as Hume maintained it should, be the slave of the passions? Can it not devise its own problems and seek its own satisfaction? Some philosophers maintain that this is its only true function. Eucken, for example,

¹ *Archiv f. d. ges. Psychologie*, Bd. iv, ix, xii.

² J. Dewey, *The School and Society*, pp. 8-9.

declares¹ : "Truth can only exist as an end in itself. 'Instrumental truth' is no truth at all." And Bosanquet distinguishes² a practical activity in which an end is assumed to be given and cognitive processes may be utilised in its attainment, from a theoretical activity in which the end is constructed by thought and in which accordingly the primacy of action over reason cannot be maintained.³ He even carries the war into the enemy's country, asserting⁴ that "no thought, probably, ever had its content exhausted in the adaptation of external action ; no thought of a cultured mind can ever be so exhausted to-day, even in the most practical of activities ; and a very great part of life, a part which even economically and industrially is an immense and commanding

¹ *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, English Trans., p. 78.

² *Logic*, vol. ii, pp. 244-5, footnote.

³ The relation of action and thought was considered by Fichte, who in his *Addresses to the German People* (English Trans., p. 75) says : "One sometimes hears the question put : What is the use of all knowledge, if one does not act in accordance with it ? This remark implies that knowledge is regarded as a means to action, and the latter as the real end. One could put the question the other way round, and ask : How could we possibly act well without knowing what the Good is ? This way of expressing it would regard knowledge as conditioning action. But both experiences are one-sided, and the truth is that both, knowledge as well as action, are in the same way inseparable elements of rational life."

⁴ *Logic*, vol. ii, p. 249.

interest in the world, has no end in external adapted action at all, but on the contrary uses and transforms such action by making it its means. A great scientific laboratory, for example, has not its unity in a material operation to be produced ; its actions have their unity in a cognition to be attained." Schiller disowns this interpretation of Pragmatism, that the organisation of reality effected by thought is confined to the production of material change in things, suggesting¹ that we should conceive "practice" more broadly as *the control of experience* ; but if Pragmatism adopted this extended sense of "practice" it would be difficult to find in it any distinctive principle justifying its existence, and Schiller virtually retracts it in the same sentence by again defining as "practical" whatever serves, directly or indirectly, to control events. If then, as Bosanquet contends, thought can set its own end, knowledge for its own sake may be a possible motive ; a "liberal" education may still be recognised as a worthy aim.

The pragmatic theory of values has also educational significance. Is Pragmatism justified, the idealist asks, in reducing "the true," "the right" and "the beautiful" to the expedient or useful ? Do they not possess characteristics which put them in quite another category ? Are they not in a

¹ *Studies in Humanism*, p. 130.

sense absolute and permanent? Mankind has throughout all the ages regarded certain truths as unique. The truths of the Christian religion, for example, have never had a merely temporary and local significance. They are believed to be eternal verities; they appeal to man with an authority that brooks no questioning; they are as far removed from the expedient as could well be; and for them men would even dare to die.¹

Such truths the idealist contends are in quite another realm of experience than the expedient; and Eucken says²: "the religious interpretation of life bases human existence upon a deeper order of reality; it raises humanity above time to eternity, above a life absorbed in external things to a life of pure inwardness." The pragmatist, by reducing "the right" to the useful or expedient, makes "duty" merely a remote interest. Thus Bode maintains³ that "the sense of duty is just the recognition of these remote interests,

¹ A Scotsman can hardly refrain from quoting in this connection, Psalm C (Scots metrical version):

For why? the Lord our God is good,
His mercy is for ever sure;
His truth at all times firmly stood,
And shall from age to age endure.

² *Main Currents in Modern Thought*, English Trans., p. 108.

³ *Fundamentals of Education*, p. 90.

without their vivid presence in the imagination." To be far-sighted is not, however, to be moral, nor is success the only criterion of a truly moral act. A good act is good even although it brings suffering in its train, and Tennyson more correctly expresses the moral standpoint than does the pragmatist when he writes :

And, because right is right, to follow right
Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence.

Pragmatism, like Naturalism, judges only by the consequences of actions, not by their motives, and thus makes morality impossible. Still more ridiculous is it to express "the beautiful" in terms of "the expedient"; in one of Sir Henry Jones's letters their relationship was expressed in the sentence : "I longed for high hedges and narrow lanes . . . and landscapes that had no use except the glorious use of being beautiful."¹ "Spiritual values and spiritual life itself," as Eucken declares,² "are not merely changed by being thus made subordinate to the useful; they are annihilated."

These defects of Pragmatism have been elaborated and emphasised because they are responsible

¹ H. J. W. Hetherington, *Life and Letters of Sir Henry Jones*, p. 219.

² *Main Currents*, p. 260.

for the essential weakness of the project method in Education. Just as the close connection between truth and life insisted on by Pragmatism has been fruitful to both, so the introduction of "the purposeful act" in learning has brought a new enthusiasm into schools; but as there is a tendency for Pragmatism to interpret life in too restricted a fashion, so educational plans based on pragmatic philosophy tend to degenerate into somewhat narrow utilitarian schemes. In consequence the cultural activities which exist for their own sake and are not mere means to material advancement fail to be developed. If the intellectualism in education resulting from Plato's too drastic separation of the sensible and intelligible worlds led to the neglect of experimental science and practical work in Education, the pragmatist's undue emphasis on practice is in danger of leading to the complementary error of neglecting pure science, of making art the handmaid to the crafts, and of employing poetry merely to decorate a project.

The project method may not be of universal application. The young child's activity seems to have no end beyond itself, and here the project method is out of place. The older pupils in a school ought to be developing an interest in the different aspects of school work for their own sake —literature for the sake of enjoyment, number for

its theoretical relations, science for the laws of science rather than for its practical applications, art for art's sake. But within these limits the project method might rule supreme, and it is interesting to observe that Rousseau, with whom in the tasks he set for Emile the project method might historically be said to have had its origin, restricted this method to the twelve to fifteen stage, to the "utility" stage of his pupil's development, on which supervened the æsthetic, moral and religious, that is, the cultural, stage.

In his work *On Education*¹ Bertrand Russell expresses in the following terms the complementary view to that of Pragmatism on the relation between the useful in Education and disinterested knowledge :

"The divorce of knowledge from life is regrettable, although during school years, it is not wholly avoidable. Where it is hardest to avoid, there should be occasional talks about the utility of the knowledge in question—taking 'utility' in a very broad sense. Nevertheless, I should allow a large place to pure curiosity, without which much of the most valuable knowledge (for instance, pure mathematics) would never have been discovered. There is much knowledge which seems to me valuable on its own account, quite apart from any use to which it is capable of being put. And I should not wish to encourage the young to look too closely for an ulterior purpose in

¹ Pp. 192-3, pp. 243-4.

all knowledge ; disinterested curiosity is natural to the young, and is a very valuable quality. It is only where it fails that I should appeal to the desire for skill such as can be exhibited in practice. Each motive has its place, but neither should be allowed to push the other aside."

Later on, he explains, more correctly :

" Utilitarian knowledge needs to be fructified by disinterested investigation, which has no motive beyond the desire to understand the world better. All the great advances are at first purely theoretical, and are only afterwards found to be capable of practical applications. And even if some splendid theory never has any practical use, it remains of value on its own account ; for the understanding of the world is one of the ultimate goods. If science and organisation had succeeded in satisfying the needs of the body and in abolishing cruelty and war, the pursuit of knowledge and beauty would remain to exercise our love of strenuous creation. I should not wish the poet, the painter, the composer, or the mathematician to be preoccupied with some remote effect of his activities in the world of practice. He should be occupied, rather, in the pursuit of a vision, in capturing and giving permanence to something which he has first seen dimly for a moment, which he has loved with such ardour that the joys of this world have grown pale by comparison. All great art and all great science springs from the passionate desire to embody what was at first an unsubstantial phantom, a beckoning beauty luring men away from safety and ease to a glorious torment. The men in whom this passion exists must not be fettered by the shackles of

a utilitarian philosophy, for to their ardour we owe all that makes man great.”¹

If culture is to be saved, it must be by developing in pupils a love of knowledge for its own sake ; the pragmatist is right in maintaining that practical activities must provide the incentives to learning, but the end must be the development of a disinterested activity. It may be that America, owing to its dependence on a pragmatic philosophy, is paying the penalty for its failure to recognise this fact in the generally admitted unsatisfactory state of its secondary education.

¹ Cf. J. G. Fichte, *Addresses to the German People*, English Trans., p. 25: "Here we have found an outward sign of true education, at once obvious and infallible; namely that every pupil on whom this education is brought to bear, without exception, and irrespective of differences in natural talent, learns with pleasure and love, purely for the sake of learning and for no other reason."

Also I. E. Miller, *Education for the Needs of Life*, p. 178 : "Just as the scientist pursues his study for the joy of investigating, so ought pupils to be permitted to undertake many projects and to follow up many lines of inquiry for the mere joy of achievement."

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CHAPTER V

IDEALISM IN EDUCATION : STATEMENT

Idealism—regards physical order as but aspect of whole—requires spiritual order to complement physical—recognises spiritual powers in man—faith of idealist as presented by Gentile. Idealist's interpretation of environment—analysis of environment—special nature of man's physical environment—characteristics of psycho-social environment—self-created, infinitely divisible, necessity for reacquirement—education a consequence. Analysis of cultural environment—threefold division unsatisfactory—arguments in favour of fourfold division—uniqueness of religion—religion as necessary as morality, art, knowledge in a complete scheme of education. Analysis of human endowment—consideration of methods distinguishing innate and acquired processes—rejection of instinctivist view—endowment comprises not only impulses, reflexes, but also primary elements of "values"—all such factors necessary in educational psychology. Psycho-analysts' use of "conflict" to characterise educative process—implies existence of moral order—and idealistic interpretation of reality. Education a reconciliation of child to all aspects of reality, including the spiritual.

IN considering Naturalism we contrasted it with Idealism, and by implication partly defined the latter. Idealism, as we have already suggested, contends that the material and physical universe known to science is an incomplete expression of reality, that it exists but to subserve, and requires to complement it, a higher type of reality, a spiritual universe. Idealism also emphasises the distinctiveness of man's nature. It attributes to

him the possession of powers which issue in the form of intellectual culture, art, morality and religion. These powers and their products are peculiar to man, and differentiate him from other animals ; they lie beyond the range of the positive sciences—biological and even psychological ; they raise problems which only philosophy can hope to solve, and make the only satisfactory basis of Education a philosophical one. The faith of the modern idealist Gentile¹ formulates thus :

“ He believes that life—true life—is man’s free creation ; that in it, therefore, human aims should gain an ever fuller realisation ; and that these aims, these ends will not be attained unless thought, which is man’s specific force, extends its sway so as to embrace nature, penetrate it, and resolve it into its own substance. He believes that nature, thus turned into an instrument of thought, yields readily to its will, not being *per se* opposed or repugnant to the life and activity of the spirit, but rather homogeneous and identical with it. He believes, moreover, that this sway can only be obtained by amplifying, strengthening, and constantly potentiating our human energy, which means thinking, knowing, self-realising ; and that self-realisation is not possible unless it is free, unless it be rescued from the prejudice of dependence upon external principles, and unless it affirms itself as absolute infinite activity. This is the *Kingdom of Man* prophesied at the dawn of modern thought.”

— T. G. Gentile, *The Reform of Education*, English Trans., pp. 139-40.

Idealism thus sees both in man's nature and in his environment factors demanding explanation ; as the latter, the environment, may be but the former " writ large," we shall consider first the idealist's interpretation of human environment. For the naturalist the environment does not raise any problems ; it is a material or physical environment to which the animals, including the human, must just adapt themselves ; the cultural environment is simply ignored.

The recent displacement of interest from man's endowment to his environment¹ is significant of a change in philosophical outlook, and pregnant with the hope of a more adequate explanation of human experience than the instinctivist interpretation initiated in modern times by McDougall.² The obvious analysis of the human environment is into the two main divisions which we may characterise respectively as the material and the cultural, or the physical and the mental. There is a natural environment and a psycho-social environment, a world of things and a world of men. The latter, the psycho-social, is unique in

¹ Cf. L. L. Bernard, *Instinct*, p. 232 : "The science of environment is just beginning to be developed." Also, p. 439 : "The scientific study of the social environment is very recent."

² *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (first published 1908).

man. "For life," as Bosanquet has said,¹ "the environment is the surface of the earth. For mind, it is the universe." It is not generally realised how great the difference is between man's physical environment and the physical environment of the animal. The animal has to take the environment as it finds it, to submit or succumb, but man has throughout the ages kept fashioning his physical environment out of all recognition to suit his own needs and purposes. As Stout said² many years ago : "To understand the full importance of this point of view we must try to realise in how thoroughgoing a way civilised society has mastered its material environment and reshaped it for the satisfaction of its own needs. Wherever we turn our eyes, we are constantly confronted with external embodiments of human will and intelligence. We must go to the wild moorland or the lonely mountain side to find mere nature, and even there we do not quite succeed." Some writers³ have remarked on this changeability of the human environment and recognised what it entails in Education, but have failed to see in it the results of man's inventive powers, to assign it to its real origin in aspects of endowment

¹ *Logic*, vol. ii, p. 238, note.

² G. F. Stout, *The Groundwork of Psychology*, p. 105.

³ E.g. F. M. Alexander, *Constructive Conscious Control of the Individual*.

which the animals do not possess but which are peculiar to man. The existence of this characteristic type of physical environment—the arte-factual, the main feature of which is change—makes demands on Education which at once distinguish it from the mere behaviour or training of animals.

The changes in man's physical environment are evidently correlated with his special capacity for inventiveness. It is only, however, when we come to consider man's cultural inheritance, when we reach "the realm of ends"¹ with all that man has produced in his efforts to realise these ends, that we can in any adequate degree appreciate the difficulty of "the riddle of the universe" he is set to solve, and the immensity of the task of education. This spiritual or cultural environment is an environment of man's own making; it is a product of man's creative activity; it makes possible man's freedom, for, as Bosanquet has observed, "no individual which has a foreign environment can act in a way purely self-expressive."²

¹ The title of Prof. James Ward's Gifford Lectures.

² *Logic*, vol. ii, p. 255. Cf. J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 352: "Freedom means essentially the part played by thinking—which is personal—in learning:—it means intellectual initiative, independence in observation, judicious invention, foresight of consequences, and ingenuity of adaptation to them."

Man himself has set the problem which he is called upon to solve, and his attitude to this environment is something far removed from the animal's attitude of adaptation to its natural but alien environment. He cannot be said to be the creature of his environment in the sense in which that term is applied to any other animal. "This is why human life has a value, why education is a mission."¹ When man emerges in the course of evolution, instead of being content like the animals to take things as he finds them, he sets about to question, to inquire their origin, to embellish what he finds or produces, to strive after something better than the given—in a word, to progress, since "progress is man's distinctive mark alone"; and thus knowledge, art and morality arise out of his divine discontent.

Not only does man's cultural environment differ from his material environment in being self-created, but it also follows from this that it is free from some of the limitations of a material environment. Material goods are restricted in quantity and their possession is governed by competition, whereas "it is a sublime though obvious truth, that the highest goods are not diminished by being diffused."² We are consequently constrained to

— — — ¹ G. Gentile, *The Reform of Education*, p. 84.

² J. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, p. 112.

ask : Should not education train the child for the enjoyment of the non-competitive factors in experience ? When individuals come to prize the higher things of life which each may enjoy without detriment to others, social discontent will disappear ; when nations realise that mere extent of territory does not imply national greatness, and when they strive in friendly rivalry to enlarge the boundaries of the spiritual realm, wars will cease. If Education should not at present prepare for such a day, philosophers should at least herald its possibility.

The spiritual possessions differ also from the material in that they have to be reacquired by each individual for himself ; they cannot be simply inherited like material wealth. "Here one generation but passes on and renovates the field of tillage for the next," as R. L. Stevenson expresses it,¹ or, as Henry Jones has said² : "Man is not the passive recipient of any spiritual gift. We cannot inherit or bequeath virtues. A man's moral and intellectual possessions are the conquests of his own sword. All the spiritual learning, its enterprise, its growing purpose will pass him by, leaving him utterly poor in soul unless he arrests it and personifies it anew in his own attainments." As these spiritual possessions have to be reacquired by each one for himself, men are

¹ *Across the Plains.*


² *Social Responsibilities.*

more nearly equal in respect to them than is the case with material possessions ; this is the real basis of the democracy of knowledge. When once acquired, these spiritual factors in experience also become permanent possessions of which the individual cannot be deprived by the chances of fortune, and, it may be, permanent possessions of the race.

On this need to reacquire at each stage the spiritual possessions of the race rests the necessity for education. The work of education, thus regarded, is to transmit from one generation to the next, with the least possible loss, the cultural or spiritual inheritance of man.¹ "Our education is human," as Gentile says,² "because it is an action, not a fact ; because it is a problem that we always solve and have to keep solving for ever." As this spiritual inheritance is the product of man's creative activity it is ever increasing, and not only

¹ Bacon regarded Education as a form of Tradition. G. K. Chesterton has expressed the same view in *What's Wrong with the World?* pp. 195-6 : "Education is a word like 'transmission' or 'inheritance' ; it is not an object but a method. It must mean the conveying of certain facts, views, or qualities to the last baby born. They might be the most trivial facts or the most preposterous views, or the most offensive qualities ; but if they are handed on from one generation to another they are education. Education is tradition."

² *The Reform of Education*, p. 35.



must Education recognise and make provision at each stage for this enhancement of experience, but it must also play its part in fostering this development. So long as the world advances and progress persists, the material to be transmitted will continue to increase ; new claims will constantly be made on Education ; a revaluation of old educational values will from time to time be necessary ; more efficient and more economical methods will have to be devised to effect this increasing transmission ; there will consequently always be an educational problem.

The analysis of the cultural environment presents difficulties, for whereas a threefold division is general, differences of opinion prevail as to the three factors to be recognised. As typical of the threefold division we may cite Horne's statement¹ :

" The elements in the spiritual environment are three in number. The reason for this number lies in the nature of mind. The spiritual environment is the achievement of the mind of the race ; these elements are consequently declaratory of the nature of the mind of the race ; but the racial mind is but the individual mind writ large : psychologists are agreed that the different ultimate modes of being conscious, the final phases of mental life, are three in number, viz., the mind knows, and feels, and wills, that is, it has an acquaintanceship with the

¹ H. H. Horne, *The Philosophy of Education*, pp. 101-2.

external world in which it takes a certain pleasure or displeasure, and on which it works certain energetic reactions. Consequently the three elements of the spiritual environment are the intellectual, what is known ; the emotional, what is felt ; and the volitional, what is willed. Considering the objects of these mental activities, the mind knows truth and avoids error ; it feels, as its highest object, beauty and avoids ugliness ; and it wills, in momentous issues, goodness and avoids evil. . . . Truth, beauty, and goodness, then, are the race's spiritual ideals, and the adjustment of the child to these essential realities that the history of the race has disclosed, is the task of supreme moment that is set for education."

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This analysis is unsatisfactory and incomplete. With such a classification difficulty is experienced in finding a place for religion. Is it to be subsumed under ethics, as is usually done, or under æsthetics, with which it has a much closer analogy, as proposed by Horne ?¹ Matthew Arnold's conception of religion as morality touched with emotion would make it share in both. No three-fold division is, however, adequate. Religion has the same absoluteness as truth, art, or morality, and it does not seem to be advisable, merely for the sake of a superficial consistency, to adopt a threefold classification. To truth, beauty and goodness must be added the ideal of the holy or the sacred, the corresponding attitude of the

¹ Loc. cit.

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individual being, according to Otto,¹ "the religious bliss that may come in worship."

The analysis presented by Horne is based on the argument from analogy, always a treacherous proceeding. He argues from the fundamental aspects of the mental process to the products of mental activity. Now the former—cognition, conation, feeling—can be dissociated from one another only theoretically; in every practical activity of mind they are all involved, although varying in degree. In knowing, conation and feeling as well as cognition are involved; in willing all three are likewise present. The three aspects then enter into intellectual inquiry, into æsthetic appreciation and into ethical endeavour. There is no reason why they should not also enter into the religious experience of worship. The fundamental aspects of the mental process are not separable activities giving rise to mental products of different types, as Horne's analysis assumes; his argument is admittedly based on an assumption which modern psychology will not for a moment countenance. Even if we assume the validity of the method adopted by Horne, we are not thereby committed to a threefold division, as the threefold classification of the aspects of the mental process, current since the time of Kant, has been abandoned by certain modern

¹ R. Otto, *The Holy*, English Trans., p. 17.

psychologists¹ in favour of a fourfold division. Were Horne's principle valid, the analogy of the aspects of the mental process would support a fourfold division of the cultural environment.

The rejection of the threefold division of the spiritual environment of man is not, however, an adequate justification for regarding religion as independent of morality and art. To demonstrate that religion is at least co-equal with morality—and a like argument applies to its relationship to art—it is incumbent on us to show positively that its ideal is different in kind from that of the latter and that the attitude it induces in the individual is other than that implied in ethical endeavour. Before proceeding, however, with this task we may suggest some general considerations for the dissociation of the two concepts. Religion is not morality; the very employment, in most languages, of two different terms to characterise them is a presumption in favour of the view that mankind has been attempting to designate two distinct types of experience. Some religions, the Greek, for example, have been essentially immoral. It is doubtless also possible for morality to exist both in a nation and in an individual independently of religion; of the former, the Japanese morality in early times has been given in illustration, and

¹ Cf. G. F. Stout, *A Manual of Psychology*, 3rd edition, or *The Groundwork of Psychology*.

of the latter certain nineteenth-century philosophers. The incompleteness of the lives of those who, availing themselves of all that religion has accomplished for the world, yet profess to be content with a mere morality, has, however, found noble expression in the statement¹ : " In the mansions of their hearts they have built a room, richly gemmed, hung round with all that is beautiful in art and literature. The sword of Justice is there ; the sceptre of Righteousness, too, is there, and even the robe of Loving Unity and Honour. Despite all these regalia it is an empty room, for the Throne is vacant." The difficulty which we experience in dissociating morality from religion arises from the fact that Christianity is essentially a rational and ethical religion. But as Francis Thompson has remarked² : " The astonishing divorce of religion from morality—nay, alliance of religion with immorality—so unthinkable to the northern mind, has always been and still is a quite natural thing to the child-like southern temper."

When we compare directly the ideals of morality and religion, we find that fundamental differences

¹ Lord Hugh Cecil.

² *Life of Loyola*, p. 24. Cf. R. Otto, *The Holy*, English Trans., p. 53 : " None the less a profoundly humble and heartfelt recognition of ' the holy ' may occur in particular experiences without being always or definitely charged or infused with the sense of moral demands."

disclose themselves. The ethical ideal embodied in the moral law is something to be attained, something which only by man's endeavour can become real. The religious ideal is by its very nature postulated as real ; it is always regarded by the religious individual as a complete and self-subsisting form of existence, as in every way perfect. God, or the religious ideal, is "the ocean that knows no shore, the fulness that never ebbs." The ideals of morality or religion appear therefore distinct ; and if, with Kant, we assert the absoluteness of the moral law, we must at the same time at least attribute uniqueness to the religious ideal or God.

In his work on *The Holy*, Otto contends that "the holy" is a category of interpretation and valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion, a valuation only belonging to the spirit of man ; it contains a quite specific element or "moment" which cannot be equated to the moral, the same being true of the category of the beautiful. This element is primary, unique, underivable from anything else. Otto's penetrating analysis of the religious experience will render inadmissible the easy identification of religion with morality—and its consequent annihilation.

When we seek to distinguish on more general grounds the religious attitude from the moral attitude, we find that the religious believer habitu-

ally maintains a practical and contemplative intercourse with what he believes to be God, God being for him the best he knows, the symbol of perfection. In contrast with the religious attitude, the ethical life is a life of struggle; the moral ideal, after the attainment of which we strive, recedes as we approach. The moral battle goes against us even unto the setting of the sun. Incompleteness, dissatisfaction characterise the moral life; success but opens up the way to further conflict, whereas in the religious life the individual feels that even if the battle is not already won, he is at least on the side that cannot be vanquished. When we identify ourselves with the whole, or, in religious language, submit our wills to the will of God, we then look upon things, in Spinoza's phrase, *sub specie æternitatis*, and thereby attain a satisfaction which morality, art or knowledge can neither give nor take away.

Religion then must be given a place with morality, art and knowledge as aspects of the spiritual environment of man; all four are different forms in which the creative activity of man manifests itself. Each is unique, but they are not mutually exclusive. Various attempts have been made to reduce one aspect to another; thus for Socrates morality is dependent on knowledge, and for Fichte religion is subordinate to knowledge. The æsthetic category is supreme

for Schiller, Herbart and Nietzsche, whereas for Plato and Fichte art is subordinate to morality, the latter maintaining that nothing is aesthetically beautiful that is not morally true. At different ages in the world's history religion has dominated knowledge, art and morality. Philosophically the four categories may be regarded as different angles from which the Absolute is viewed ; practically they may be regarded as interwoven in the fabric of life ; educationally each may be regarded as an aspect of personality, and the principle of correlation in teaching demands that for the full realisation of any one the others must not be neglected.

If then we divide the human environment into natural or material, and psycho-social or cultural, and the former again into the physical and technical, the latter into intellectual, aesthetic, ethical and religious, we must conclude that any system of education which claims to be comprehensive must prepare the child to appreciate all these aspects, and that a system of education which ignores any one is necessarily incomplete. The idealist in Education, believing that the intangible values are the ultimate and eternal realities, will also emphasise the spiritual aspects of experience, insisting that knowledge, art, morality and religion are the aspects of life of supremest moment.

We must now seek a view of the child's endowment that is at least compatible with our idealistic interpretation of environment and life, but the difficulty that meets us at the outset is to determine what factors are innate and what acquired. Thorndike¹ has formulated certain principles which have enabled this difficulty to be attacked. Thus, if the environments are alike with respect to a trait, the differences in respect to it are due entirely to original nature ; if the original natures are alike with respect to a trait, the differences in respect to it are due entirely to differences in training ; and the problem of relative shares, where both are effective, includes all the separate problems of each kind of environment acting with each kind of nature. As practically all our experience falls into the third category, where both factors are effective, some further principle of determination is requisite, and Thorndike supplies the following :—If differences in opportunity cause the differences men display, the provision of equal amounts of the same sort of training for all individuals should reduce the differences.

Applying these principles Thorndike confesses that he found the facts rather startling. "Equalizing practice *seems to increase differences*. The

¹ E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*, vol. iii, pp. 304-14.

superior man seems to have got his present superiority by his own nature rather than by superior advantages of the past, since, during a period of equal advantages for all, he increases his lead." In his *Discourse on Inequality* Rousseau, while maintaining that inequalities are the result of civilisation whereas in the natural order all men are equal, adds, in terms similar to Thorndike's : " Education not only makes a difference between such as are cultured and such as are not, but even increases the differences which exist among the former, in proportion to their respective degrees of culture, as the distance between a giant and a dwarf on the same road increases with every step they take." Bagley in *Determinism and Education*¹ questions the universality of this conclusion, also pointing out that by expressing the gains in improvement in percentages instead of in absolute amounts Thorndike's order can be inverted.² Thus differences in musical ability doubtless increase with equal additional amounts of practice, but in games, as we approximate perfect performance, practice effects diminish and the tyro gains on

¹ Pp. 149-55.

² Cf.—modified from Thorndike's *Educational Psychology* :

	Absolute Gain.	% Gain.
85	147	61
31	57	26

us. To Thorndike's conclusion that "the influences of environment are differential," Bagley opposes the statement that "mentality distils its own corrective." But the ultimate conclusions are not far apart; thus Bagley maintains "it is not too much to say that both *equalities and inequalities in mental abilities* are of far less significance to the theory and practice of democracy than are *resemblances and differences in mental content*, that is to say, in *ideas, ideals and standards*"; and Thorndike, while insisting that the prizes which most men really seek, are after all in large measure given or withheld by original nature, adds: "But the prizes which education *ought* to seek are all within its power. The results for which a rational mankind would strive are determined largely by mankind itself."

By employing statistical formulæ specially devised for the purpose, and by defining "nature," "nurture" and "maturity" in such terms as to make them applicable to the data at his disposal, Truman Kelley in *The Influence of Nurture upon Native Differences*, although acknowledging that there is ample room for certain doubts and queries, has come to the conclusion that "the data presented point to the nurture effect as being more often a levelling of native differences than an augmenting of these."¹ It would appear from

¹ P. 19.

his research that, for example, innate differences in computation-ability are reduced by nurture or schooling, whereas language-usage differences are increased. American education generally seems to reduce the differences, the development of which would be an advantage to society, and to accentuate those, uniformity in which would make for social stability. The policy which Truman Kelley would prescribe is one "which preserves and utilizes individual peculiarity except where it is established that social stability demands otherwise."¹ This, one may infer, can be effected by changes in educational outlook and in pedagogical procedure. From the results of Truman Kelley's exceedingly intricate statistical analysis, one becomes more than ever convinced that, as a great psychologist has said² : "The first thing the educationist should be clear about is as to what he intends, as to what his end and aim is, or rather should be. To ascertain this ideal, he must turn not to psychology, but to life: it is a social and ethical, rather than a psychological problem."

Since the conclusions of the statistical treatment of the relative contributions of nature and nurture are indecisive, we must revert to psychological analysis to determine what are the given

¹ P. 25.

² J. Ward, *Psychology Applied to Education*, p. 103.

factors in experience. A consideration of the cultural environment has disclosed the fact that cultural values have to be acquired by each individual during his lifetime. As the one characteristic of instinctive activity is that it is not acquired during the lifetime of the individual, the cultural bases of endowment are not instinctive. The fact that the chief characteristic of human environment is its changeable and progressive nature, likewise suggests that an instinctively determined endowment would be utterly incapable of meeting the demands of such an environment. While psychology tends to stress the instinctive bases of endowment, Education is compelled to emphasise the intelligent and rational aspects. Thus Miller says¹ :

“ Education must take account of those factors in the process of adjustment that make it possible for men to change this environment to meet new and changing needs. It must emphasise intelligence, initiative, originality, enterprise. It is not so much a fixed adjustment that we want as adjustability. . . .

“ In the course of a few years the child born helpless, ignorant, and dependent must be adjusted to a rich, complex, and changing environment. He must have acquired the fundamental methods and processes of business, government, art, religion, and some specific vocation. The rising generation must take over into

¹ *Education for the Needs of Life*, pp. 12, 14.

their lives all the fundamental values of civilization that have been acquired in thousands of years of progress. Furthermore, control over the process of adjustment itself must be achieved. There must be such development of insight, intelligence, originality, and initiative that further modifications both of the self and of the physical and social environment, can be made in the interest of further progress."

And Bagley has added ¹ :

"Neither the theory of education nor the theory of democracy can well reject the terms 'ideas,' 'ideals,' 'standards'—terms which at least imply that mentality has something to do with conscious experience."

Instinct, as we have just said, cannot meet such rapidly changing conditions as human environment necessitates. The vital urge in animals expends itself in instinctive activities ; in man it breaks the shackles of instinct and emerges in new forms more generalised than is possible to instinct ; "this is the destiny from which man is ransomed by the power of his freedom," as Gentile states.² The principle that should doubtless guide us is that instinct is restricted to fairly definite forms of response and behaviour ; it cannot be generalised, whereas human life with its constantly changing requirements demands

—¹ *Determinism in Education*, p. 155.

² *The Reform of Education*, p. 53.

powers in man which must be capable of generalisation ; man, in fact, can turn his hand to anything. Play, for example, is denied by McDougall¹ to be an instinct, and rightly so, because it takes too diversified a form in human life ; we need only instance the rugger scrum and the chess player or the disciple of Izaak Walton. Shand² refuses to recognise curiosity as an instinct ; and on similar grounds he is doubtless right. The sex "instinct" in man with its taboos, its aberrations and sublimations, its complexes and its idealisations, is surely something far different from what it is in the animals. Life itself is likewise from this point of view too complex and varied in its manifestations to be regarded as the unrolling of an instinct. To speak, too, of directing instinct into other channels, is to render self-contradictory any definition of instinct that could be profitable. Even if we allow instinct to connote trial-and-error learning, we must recognise that, as Bosanquet stated³—even before Köhler's results were available—"as adapted response passes under the

¹ *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, 16th edition, pp. 107-16.

² A. F. Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, p. 441 : he regards it as one of our primary impulses.

³ *Logic*, vol. ii, p. 242. Cf. R. Otto, *The Holy*, p. 118 : "To try to understand and deduce the human from the sub-human or brute mind is to try to fit the lock to the key instead of vice-versa."

control of intelligence, it becomes emancipated from trial-and-error."

The futility of attempting to account for the highly diversified forms of human activity by reference to a limited number of elementary instincts is now becoming apparent, and psychology is falling back on impulses which possess greater flexibility. In his inventory of the original tendencies of man Thorndike¹ went far in this direction ; Bernard² has contended that what are inherited are unit characters, not complicated functions ; and in *Human Nature and Conduct* Dewey has³ enlarged on this contention, noting : "The word instinct taken alone is still too laden with the older notion that an instinct is always definitely organised and adapted—which for the most part is just what it is not in human beings. The word impulse suggests something primitive, yet loose, undirected, initial." It is likewise a welcome sign to find in a British Journal of Psychology an article dealing with "Reflexes in Early Childhood : Their Development, Variability, Evanescence, Inhibition, and Relation to Instincts."⁴ We must also not neglect to posit as factors in man's endowment the elemen-

¹ *Educational Psychology*, vol. i.

² *Instinct*, p. 232.

³ P. 105, note.

⁴ *The British Journal of Medical Psychology*, vol. vii (1927), pp. 1-35, by C. W. Valentine.

tary bases of "values." Schiller in *Studies in Humanism*, dealing with "The Relation of Logic to Psychology," has asked : " How can values arise in the human mind ? " We might equally well ask, " How can instincts arise in animal bodies ? " Values may be, and doubtless are, " data " for Psychology, primary elements, basic factors of our psychical nature, and the only profitable question that can be asked is how they are affected by, and how do they influence, the other primary psychical factors. It is unscientific to assume that they merely " evolve " out of the latter ; the term " evolve " is too often employed to mask a transition from a primitive aspect of experience to another aspect, not merely quantitatively but qualitatively different. Thus Otto contends¹ that the " ought " of morality is " a primary and unique meaning, as little derivable from another, as blue from bitter," and that it " is only ' evolvable ' out of the spirit of man itself, and then in the sense of being ' arousable ' because it is already potentially implanted in him " ; and in regard to religion he maintains² : " There is, of course, no ' transmission ' of it in the proper sense of the word ; it cannot be ' taught,' it must be ' awakened ' from the spirit." To ignore such factors is to render educational psychology profitless.

¹ *The Holy*, pp. 44-5. Cf. p. 118. ² *Ibid.*, p. 62.

From the day of his birth the child's innate capacities or propensities—impulses, reflexes, the primary elements of values, etc.—are aroused by environmental stimuli and modified by environmental influences ; their main characteristic is just their modifiability or plasticity, and this is reflected in the long infancy of the human animal. His physical needs are regulated by habit ; habit is said to be second nature, but habit acts right from the dawn of life, and thus the child's first or original nature has no opportunity for manifesting itself. Imitation functions early, and social pressure is exerted thereby, and the force of the cultural inheritance begins to bear on him through language. Life thus becomes a habit¹ ; and a social-construction, and "education becomes the art of taking advantage of the helplessness of the young."² Rousseau would try to save the original nature of man by classifying habits into natural habits, and social or conventional habits, approving the former and condemning the latter, but all habits in the life of man are socially initiated and maintained. Findlay admits³ that a good deal of home and school-nursery discipline is contrary to nature ; in a sense it is all contrary to nature.

¹ Both Bernard and Dewey employ "habit" in this extended sense.

² *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 58.

³ *The Foundations of Education*, vol. ii, p. 13.

The question is not whether it is natural or not, but whether it is wisely or unwisely imposed. Thus the greater freedom enjoyed by the modern child is not the result of an instinct of self-assertion in him, but of a change of view and consequent change of treatment on the part of adult society, the parent and teacher having come to possess a truer view of the meaning of life and of the methods by which their aim can be attained.

The correction of the instinctivist point of view by the environmentalist should not, however, lead us to neglect the element of truth in the former. Such neglect would result in regarding education as too easy a process, as many popular views of education do at present. The psychologists who have adopted and advocated the instinctivist standpoint have done a service in emphasising the intimate relationship between the physical nature of man and his mental life, thus correcting the view of mind as independent which naturally followed from the psychological doctrine of the parallelism of mind and body ; their defect was that their explanations hardly got beyond the physical behaviour of man. The same intimate relationship between body and mind, but in this case with mind as the determining factor, is one of the assumptions of psycho-analysis. Education must then recognise, and, as we shall see later, reconcile the inborn nature of man with the

cultural products evolved by society. While denying that man's life is instinctively determined, Education must find some way of utilising the impulses of man's endowment and of satisfying his physical appetites and needs which is compatible with the cultural requirements of society ; its work, as Herbart has said, is to graft valuable shoots on to wild stems.

If psychology with its instinctivist interpretation of man has misled Education, psychology has also provided the clue to a more complete and satisfactory explanation of the educative process, for it is noteworthy that psycho-analysts, when they refer to Education, almost unanimously, although doubtless unwittingly, employ the term "conflict." Bernard¹ quotes from Herrick's *Introduction to Neurology* to the effect that "conflict" is inherent in the cosmic process, or at least in the biological part of it, from beginning to end, and that out of this conflict intelligence was born. If life itself thus displays conflict, education should reflect it ; accordingly, we find Ernest Jones maintaining² :

"It is commonly not realised how extensive is the work performed by these influences [the reforming influences of education], nor how violent is the internal conflict they provoke before they finally achieve their aim. Without them the individual would remain a

¹ *Instinct*, pp. 52-3. ² *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, p. 124.

selfish, jealous, impulsive, aggressive, dirty, immodest, cruel, egocentric and conceited animal, inconsiderate of the needs of others, and unmindful of the complicated social and ethical standards that go to make a civilised society.”

Rivers in his *Instinct and the Unconscious*¹ likewise says :

“ The process of education in childhood consists, or should consist, in the direction of innate or instinctive tendencies towards an end in harmony with the highest good of society of which the child is an active member. Childhood is one long conflict between instinctive tendencies and the social traditions and ideals of society. Whether the outcome of this conflict is to be a genius or a paranoic ; a criminal or a philanthropist ; a good citizen or a wastrel, depends in some measure, we do not yet know with any degree of exactness, in what measure, on education.”

A writer on *The Psychology of the Unadjusted School Child*² finds himself inevitably committed to the concept “ conflict,” maintaining :

“ Any educator who thinks only of making easy the road to adult character is attacking the problem in the wrong manner ; no programme which would eliminate struggle for the individual is a sound one. The critical thing is to see that the adjustment that is made as a result of the conflict is one that will benefit the individual.”

¹ P. 151.

² J. J. B. Morgan, p. 31.

Another recent writer has not hesitated to entitle his work *Youth in Conflict*,¹ and in it to say :

“ The child, struggling from infancy to win affection and esteem from each member of the family, is living in a world of conflict: This is healthy. This is splendid. The normal child should learn his way by acts and attitudes which are pleasing to good parents, and bring rewards of approval, success and love. It is conflict that makes life interesting.”

And Bagley in *Determinism and Education*,² protesting against the wrong conception of discipline and freedom in education, although not employing the term “ conflict,” warns us that education must reflect in each generation this element of struggle and conquest.

These citations, and they could be multiplied,³ may bring us to realise that education is not an easy adaptation to a simple environment of innate characteristics, either instinctive, as the naturalists contend, or ideal, as Rousseau, Fichte and Fröbel maintained: there is likewise in the connotation of “ conflict ” something of more moment than “ the struggle for existence ”; it suggests rather a struggle for freedom. The term “ conflict ”

¹ Miriam Van Waters, p. 48.

² P. 160.

³ E.g. J. J. Findlay, *The Foundations of Education*, vol. i, p. 12: “ Those inherited impulses which we call appetites and instincts have led to conflict and the dawn of self-control.”

implies the presence of two factors, the child's innate tendencies and cultural or ideal values. The psycho-analyst must posit the existence of the latter, otherwise there would be no conflict, and he would find himself with his occupation gone—Saul is also among the prophets. But having posited the existence of a moral order, the psycho-analyst is usually content to leave it at that, its construction being the product of the conscious mind, which does not come within his province. While psycho-analytic writers generally assume that the conflict arises from the repression of instinctive tendencies, neurotic symptoms may nevertheless follow the denial of the moral demands, as Morton in *Childhood's Fears*¹ has strongly emphasised. The concept "conflict" likewise suggests that there is a heterogeneity between two aspects of man's nature, that they are not quite of the same texture as the naturalists and pragmatists contend; man, as a consequence, is the only animal that develops complexes. Psycho-analysts are thus witnesses to the belief in an idealistic interpretation of reality, which is also implied in the modern view of education as conflict.

The conflict in which the child is engaged is many-sided, but is mainly between different

¹ Ch. iii and ch. v, especially p. 100, Note on "The Moral Demand." Cf. p. 160.


aspects of his cultural inheritance. Through all the complexities and difficulties it is the task of the educator to make straight a highway for the child, to see to it that the conflict is not quite beyond his strength, that the demands are not too onerous, to save him, as Ward¹ has cautioned us, "the demoralization of defeat." And if the teacher cannot aid, he must see to it that he does not hinder or obstruct. In the past education has too frequently been a conflict, a conflict between the teacher and the pupil; and that is unpardonable. The Handicaps of Childhood² are sufficiently penalising and numerous without the teacher adding to their number. The child, too, must be given freedom to fight, but not to retreat and abandon the struggle. It is a conflict which he must wage for himself, and the victory, to have any value for him, must be his very own. Hence in the new education it is the teacher's privilege to direct, encourage, sympathise. Only where he adequately realises the nature of the conflict in which the child is engaged, is his intervention likely to be prudent and skilful, is he *aptus ad discendum*.

But if the process of education is a conflict, the end is a reconciliation. The purpose of education is to enable the child to reconcile.

¹ *Psychology Applied to Education*, p. 42.

² Cf. H. Addis's work under this title.

himself to reality in all its manifestations, not merely to adapt himself to a natural environment. Such a reconciliation is not impossible, because, as we have indicated, the cultural environment is the product of man's creative activity, and the physical environment has likewise been largely fashioned by his inventive powers. The conflict is not with something quite alien to man ; it is with those of his own household ; it is a fight that has begun within himself. When we recognise the priority of man's unique cultural environment, when we realise that in the transmission and increase of this cultural inheritance through its constant recreation lies the supreme task of education, that man possesses spiritual powers adequate to the task, then our philosophy of education is idealistic, and doubtless only then adequate.



CHAPTER VI

IDEALISM IN EDUCATION: HISTORICAL REVIEW

Idealism—origin in Socrates—man's universal nature his starting-point—teleological view of nature. Plato's idealism reflects Socratic origin—“intelligible” world divorced from “sensible”—education abstract—formal training a consequence—restriction of education to higher classes in community. Aristotle both more practical and more idealistic than Plato—recognition of the useful in Education. Stoicism idealistic—“according to nature” and “according to reason” equivalent. Christianity finally established idealistic tradition. Modern idealism—origin in Rousseau—Rousseau an idealist—supremacy of moral order—discipline by natural consequences partial—origin of Rousseau's anti-social view in Seneca—nature of man, good—anticipations of Kant. Kant's problem—establishment of validity of scientific truth and of moral law—priority of practical reason—no support thereby for Pragmatism—conception of duty—application of concept to education—freedom, an ideal—development of freedom recognised by educationists—freedom in modern education. Fichte—freedom and self-activity—Fichte and Pestalozzi. Pestalozzi's idealism—Fröbel—fluence of idealistic writers—innate goodness—dialectical process—recapitulation—unfolding—comparison with Hegel. Gentile—modern representative of Idealism.

“IDEALISM in one form or other,” says Adams,¹ “permeates the whole of the history of philosophy.” In Education Comenius² has been regarded as one of its earliest exponents, but it

¹ *The Evolution of Educational Theory*, p. 284.

² W. Boyd, *The History of Western Education*, pp. 262-3.

doubtless originated with Socrates, and is clearly evident in the writings of Plato. There are two things which, according to Aristotle,¹ we may fairly attribute to Socrates, his inductive discourses and his universal definitions. His inductive discourses constituted the method by which Socrates sought to arrive at the universal ; in Plato's *Republic* the latter is referred to as "the method of mutual admissions,"² and the most characteristic feature of the method was the need for a companion in the search for truth. Thus in the *Protagoras*³ Socrates is represented as saying that when anyone apprehends alone, he immediately goes about and searches for someone to whom he may communicate his thought and with whom he may establish it. This is no mere accidental circumstance in the method of Socrates ; it is the essence of the method ; it is the external form or manifestation of the fact that truth is universal. Thus in the *Gorgias*⁴ Socrates says : "I consider I shall have proved nothing unless I make you yourself the one willing witness of my words ; neither will you, unless you have me as the one witness of yours, no matter about the rest of the world." This universality of truth, as against the sophistic and pragmatic view that each man can be a law unto himself, is a distinctive

¹ *Metaphysics*, 1078, 6.

² § 348.

³ § 348.

⁴ § 472.

tenet of Idealism. Fichte expresses the same principle in *The Theory of the State*,¹ and Bosanquet² argues that this search after the universal contributes to the solidarity of the race. Another feature of the method of Socrates was that he was always saying the same things about the same things, and he was twitted by Hippias with this³ : "What, still repeating the same old talk, Socrates, which I used to hear from you long ago ?" "Yes," retorted Socrates, "and what is still more strange, Hippias, it is not only the same old talk, but about the same old subjects. Now you, I daresay, through versatility of knowledge, never say the same thing twice over on the same subject." Here in naïve form we have an assertion of the timelessness of certain truths, a characteristic alluded to in our criticism of Pragmatism.

In addition to the two things which Aristotle attributed to Socrates there was a third and greater with which Socrates might be credited, but which Plato and Aristotle, standing in the same succession, would fail to observe and record, namely, the initiation of Idealism in philosophy. Socrates did not, like modern philosophers, take all

¹ G. H. Turnbull, *The Educational Theory of J. G. Fichte*, pp. 266-7.

² *Logic*, vol. i, p. 43.

³ Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, IV, iv, §§ 4-6.

knowledge for his province; faced with the alternative of making man or nature his starting-point he chose the former, and in doing so was the first to draw the distinction between science and philosophy, and to establish Idealism. "In contrast to others," Xenophon says,¹ "he set his face against all discussion of such high matters as the nature of the universe," and in the *Apology*² Socrates is reported as saying: "The simple truth is that I have nothing to do with physical speculation." The proper business of mankind is man, he assumed. "Did these investigators [of nature]," he asked,³ "feel their knowledge of things human so complete that they betook themselves to these lofty speculations? Or did they maintain that they were playing their proper parts in thus neglecting the affairs of man to speculate on the concerns of God?"

If we could completely account for Socrates thus turning away from nature, we should have the key to his philosophy. The inadequacy of the results which the study of nature affords can hardly be held to account for his conversion. Indeed, the step which he took is just the very reverse of that which the modern mind would take; it is to the uniform working of nature that

¹ *Memorabilia*, I, i, § 11.

² § 19. Cf. *Phædo*, § 96.

³ *Memorabilia*, I, i.

we turn to find a field where there is some hope of a harvest, not to the capricious acts of mortal man, and even when Wordsworth apostrophises duty, it is to the heavens that he goes for its highest exemplification :

Thou dost preserve the Stars from wrong ;
And the most ancient Heavens, through Thee, are fresh and strong.

Only in one passage,¹ or at most in two, if a passage in the *Phædo* is ascribed to him, did Socrates express views on the system of nature. From these it is evident, as Caird has indicated, that had he attempted to construct a natural philosophy, he would have adopted the teleological view of things in which God would have been conceived as a designer working with a conscious purpose to realise an end, and that end the happiness of his creatures, especially man. Now a mind given to seek for a teleological explanation of things must soon turn away in dissatisfaction from the merely mechanical explanations which are all that science can offer. Such a trend of mind might thus account for Socrates turning to ethics, for he would naturally be led to suppose that all things were disposed to contribute to the happiness of man. Socrates thus constantly sought to de-

¹ *Memorabilia*, I, iv, §§ 2-8. Cf. E. Caird, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. i, pp. 65-6.

termine the purpose, end or function of a thing.¹ Thus, in the *Lysis*² he is represented as declaring : " Although we may often say that gold and silver are highly valued by us, that is not the truth ; for there is a further object, whatever it might be, which we value most of all, and for the sake of which gold and all other possessions are acquired by us. . . . And may not the same be said of a friend ? That which is only dear to us for the sake of something else is improperly said to be dear, but the truly dear is that in which all these so-called friendships terminate." Again in the *Euthydemus*,³ " And if we knew how to convert stones into gold, the knowledge would be of no value to us, unless we knew how to use the gold." In the *Symposium*⁴ Socrates, when asked, " What does he gain who possesses the good ? " replied " Happiness," the reason being annexed : " Nor is there any need to ask why a man desires happiness ; the answer is already final." The teleological trend of Socrates's mind may thus account for the restriction of his inquiries to things human, and the more he concerned himself with ethical topics the more would he be repelled

¹ Schiller, *Studies in Humanism*, pp. 54-5, argues that the exact meaning of Plato's Idea of Good is the "concept of End," "the postulate of a complete teleological explanation of the universe."

² § 220.

³ § 289.

⁴ § 204.

from science as indifferent to, if not, as Huxley in modern times has held, adverse to the development of morality. The teleological outlook was likewise the determining factor of his idealism.

Plato's idealism reflects its Socratic origin. There is at once the emphasis on, and precedence of, the universal, the permanent, to the neglect and rejection of the actual and temporary. For Plato the things that are seen are temporal, the things that are unseen are eternal. His " Ideas " are " the divine originals,"¹ and experience of these constitutes science or knowledge, whereas those who cannot apprehend principles apart from their concrete embodiments, live in what Plato calls " a dreaming state "; their acquaintance with things only ranks as " opinion "; they apprehend the actual, they do not comprehend the real. Plato maintains that opinion is appointed to one sphere and science to another.² He exaggerates the distinction between the spheres of knowledge and of opinion, and even asserts³ that his premises " make it impossible to identify the object-matter of science and that of opinion." This dualism vitiates almost every aspect of Plato's philosophy. It is inherited from Socrates, who to find the ultimate purpose of existence turned away from nature, unlike the modern idealist, who seeks to find in a deeper interpretation of nature the

¹ *Republic*, § 500.

² *Ibid.*, § 477.

³ *Ibid.*, § 478.

true significance of reality. This dualism is the source of the popular belief that anything "idealistic" must be remote from the realities of life.

In accordance with this view the education of the philosopher in Plato's *Republic* does not consist in a mere extension of knowledge, a further development of experience, but, according to the simile of the cave,¹ it demands a complete inversion of attitude or redirection of mind. "Our present argument shows that there is a faculty residing in the soul of each person, and an instrument enabling each of us to learn, and that just as we might suppose it to be impossible to turn the eye round from darkness to light without turning the whole body, so must this faculty, or this instrument, be wheeled round, in company with the entire soul, from the perishing world, until it be enabled to endure the contemplation of the real world and the brightest part thereof, which, according to us, is the Form of the Good."² In selecting subjects for inclusion in the philosophers' curriculum Plato dismisses as inadequate Music and Gymnastic, which constituted the curriculum of the Guardians, because these subjects are engaged upon the changeable, whereas the sciences he is in search of must deal with the real³; they must be "of universal application"

¹ *Republic*, bk. vii. ² *Ibid.*, § 518. ³ *Ibid.*, § 522.

and at the same time "lead to reflection"—the former requirement recalling the Socratic definitions, and the latter recognising the existence of "objects of a higher order" in addition to the objects of perception. The curriculum which Plato arrived at comprised Number, Geometry, Astronomy, Harmonics, all preparatory to Metaphysics. It is not so much the subjects selected as the reasons that he gives for them, that disclose the inadequacy of his Idealism, although in dismissing the manual arts as degrading¹ he reveals his aristocratic and exclusive caste of mind. Number is to be studied not with a view to buying and selling, but for the purposes of war, and to facilitate the conversion of the soul itself from the changeable to the true and the real,² and it is in this connection that he introduces the formal training argument.³ Geometry is likewise recommended because it facilitates our contemplation of the essential Form of the Good. In regard to astronomy he says⁴ : "We shall pursue astronomy with the help of problems, just as we pursue geometry : but we shall let the heavenly bodies alone, if it is our design to become really acquainted with astronomy, and by that means

¹ *Republic*, § 522.

² *Ibid.*, § 525.

³ For discussion of Plato's responsibility in this connection see the writer's *The Doctrines of the Great Educators*, pp. 22-4.

⁴ *Republic*, § 529.

to convert the natural intelligence of the soul from a useless into a useful possession." It is in recommending the study of the mathematical bases of music that he speaks of it as "a work useful in the search after the beautiful and the good, though useless if pursued with other ends." These subjects form but the prelude to the study of Dialectic, "the coping-stone" of the sciences; and the special training in dialectical reasoning is necessary for the complete philosopher to enable him to grasp "by pure intelligence" "the real nature of the Good."¹

Not only is the education of the philosophers who are to be rulers in his ideal state one-sided, but Plato's scheme of higher education is restricted to this one class in the community, the "Guardians" receiving only the general education in Music and Gymnastic, and the artisans, who were to be allowed no share in the government of the state, had to be content with what might be designated a premature vocational training² or with no education at all. This restriction of the benefits of education to the governing class is typical of ancient education, as contrasted with modern education which is democratic and has taken upon itself the more difficult task of devising an education for "all the children of all the people." By its exclusion of the artisans from

¹ *Republic*, § 532. ² *Ibid.*, § 467. Cf. also *Laws*, § 643.

participating in its government Plato's state must be refused the designation "ideal"; as Newman has expressed it¹: "The best state is that which is all gold, not that which is tipped with gold. . . . 'Ten Just Men' do not make a good State, any more than one swallow makes a summer. The secret of a State's excellence lies in the fact of its consisting of a large body of excellent citizens organized aright. Plato had sacrificed much that makes life worth having without realizing in any one of the three sections of his State the most desirable life." Plato, the great idealist, was thus not idealistic enough.

Although Aristotle is the best critic of, and commentator on Plato, it must be remarked that he is first and above all the disciple of Plato. The points of agreement are, if not greater in number, at least more important than the points of difference. As Newman remarks²: "It was a fortunate circumstance that Plato's philosophical inheritance passed to a successor sufficiently at one with him to maintain the continuity of speculation, and sufficiently independent to give a fresh impulse and direction to inquiry." Thus Aristotle is, like Socrates and Plato, an idealist, but, dominated by biological rather than metaphysical categories, his writings do not exhibit the

¹ W. L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, vol. i, p. 428.

² *The Politics of Aristotle*, vol. i, p. 461.

sharp contrasts and strong oppositions encountered in Plato. His political philosophy is in some respects more ideal than Plato's, while being also more practical, for he does not regard the rulers and the ruled as belonging to two distinct classes in the community, but assumes that the latter in their turn with age and education will succeed to the duties of rulers. The good citizen should know how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman—these are the virtues of a citizen.¹ While asserting the importance of a liberal education, he does not betray that fear of the practical subjects that Plato does. Thus he maintains² that children should be taught the useful things which are really necessary, but without vulgarising them. "In his view," according to Newman,³ "the object of youthful education is to produce a being who will find his happiness in the exercise of the moral and intellectual virtues—to whom not only vice, but an over-estimate of external and bodily goods, will be distasteful—who will live for the noblest things that men can live for, simply because to do otherwise would be painful to him." The ideal of a liberal education thus portrayed has remained a characteristic feature of idealistic education.

¹ *Politics*, III, iv, 15.

² *Ibid.*, VIII, ii, 3.

³ *The Politics of Aristotle*, vol. i, p. 373.

The idealistic aspect of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle was that adopted by Stoicism,¹ "the greatest system of organised thought which the mind of man has built up for itself in the Græco-Roman world before the coming of Christianity with its inspired book and its authoritative revelation."² In opposition to the Epicurean view that to be conscious that one's maxims lead to happiness is virtue, the Stoics maintained that nothing is worth living for except goodness, and goodness the later Stoics—following Socrates, Plato and Aristotle—defined as performing one's function well, or living according to Nature. Living according to Nature means working with Nature in her eternal effort towards perfection. "It does not mean 'living simply' or 'living like a natural man.' It means living according to the spirit which makes the world grow and progress."³ This view we find in later educationists who must be classed as idealists ; it also serves as a warning against too hurriedly dismissing as "naturalists" all who counsel us to live "according to nature."

¹ Cf. E. H. Reisner, *Historical Foundations of Modern Education*, p. 95.

² Gilbert Murray, *The Stoic Philosophy*, p. 14.

³ Pp. 32-4. Cf. Seneca, *Epistulæ Morales*, cxviii : "How, then, can the Good be recognised ? Only if it is completely according to nature."

Stoicism served as a religion as well as a philosophy ; it gave man armour when the world was predominantly evil, and it encouraged him forward when the world was predominantly good.¹ It thus preserved the idealistic tradition till this tradition was finally established by Christianity. The Christian view of life is unequivocally idealistic, personality—the fatherhood of God and the divine sonship of Jesus Christ—being its highest category, although by its depreciation of the world and the flesh, it at times became almost dualistic. So pronouncedly idealistic, however, are the doctrines of all schools of Christian thought that it becomes quite unnecessary to exhibit or elaborate the idealistic trend in their educational schemes.

Modern Idealism culminated in the German movement of the early nineteenth century, and education could not remain uninfluenced by this great intellectual revolution which paralleled the social and political upheaval of the French revolution.² These two revolutions had a common origin ; “ in German idealism the patient

¹ Cf. G. Murray, *Stoicism*, pp. 49-50.

² German Idealism has been stated by Heine to be the offspring of the Reformation, *Religion and Philosophy in Germany*, English Trans., p. 59. In his *Address to the German People*, vi, Fichte connects the Reformation, Modern Idealism and the French Revolution.

suffering of generations raises its voice," says a recent German writer.¹ The cure for such discontent was a new conception of individual and social morality, a new conception of the individual's worth and of the constitution of the state. Kant provided the metaphysical basis of the new morality. His problem originated on the intellectualist side. It was set by the bankruptcy of English empiricism expressed in Hume's candid confession that "All my hopes vanish when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory which gives me satisfaction on this head. In short there are two principles which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, namely, *that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences*, and *that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences*. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there would be no difficulty in the case."² In more general form the problem was set originally by Locke, who in his *Essay Concerning the Human Understanding* proposed "an examination of our abilities to ascertain what objects our under-

¹ Gertrude Bäumer, *Fichte und sein Werk*, p. 10.

² Appendix to *Treatise of Human Nature*.

standings are or are not, fitted to deal with.”¹ Kant’s answer, evolved on metaphysical lines, is similar to that arrived at by modern psychology from its own standpoint, namely, the correlation of the mind and the world it knows, or the reciprocal relationship of the individual’s endowment and his environment, for which Stern² employs the term “convergence.” But a theory of knowledge or even a theory of reality based on a purely metaphysical speculation would not have moved the world, had it not had some bearing on the moral, religious and political life of mankind.

If English empiricism set the problem to German idealism, French Romanticism in the person of Rousseau suggested the answer. Not in society, Rousseau taught, was the individual to find the sanctions of morality, but in his own nature. His freedom was to be found in being true to his own self; the individual must be able to call his soul his own. Kant likewise based freedom on man’s inner nature. Rousseau’s thesis was to preserve the individual’s freedom in a society dominated by conventionality, Kant’s to save man’s freedom in a natural world determined by necessity. To trace in Rousseau’s writings the germs of modern idealism will therefore be our first task.

¹ Epistle to the Reader.

² *Psychology of Early Childhood*, English Trans., pp. 50-6.

It may appear somewhat paradoxical to attribute the origin of German idealism to Rousseau,¹ who is not infrequently classed as a "naturalist,"² but Rousseau's doctrine is not in the philosophical sense "naturalistic." Nature for him is not opposed to reason or spirit, but to convention, typified by society as he conceived it. Like modern idealists he seeks to do justice to nature, and to give it its rightful place in the scheme of things ; he does not, however, regard nature as the whole of, and ultimate form of, reality, but recognises the existence of a moral order³ in which reason and conscience are the controlling factors, and a spiritual order which embraces and explains the natural order : "The Incompre-

¹ In his *Doctrines of the Great Educators*, pp. 143-4, the writer has also contended that in the *Emile* Rousseau was expounding a universal system of education and that the introduction of a specific pupil was merely an expository device ; that the *Emile*, if it did not originate the democratic tendency in Education—that was done by Comenius in his *Great Didactic*—at least reinforced it to such a degree that it has become an accepted tenet in modern education. This view of Rousseau removes the difficulty of explaining how the idealistic and democratic systems of Pestalozzi and later writers originated in the *Emile*.

² E.g. W. H. Hudson, *Rousseau and Naturalism in Life and Thought*. G. Compayre, *J. J. Rousseau and Education from Nature*.

³ Cf. *Emile*, Everyman Trans., p. 196 : "We have reached the moral order at last."

hensible embraces all, he gives its motion to the earth, and shapes the system of all creatures, but our eyes cannot see him nor can our hands search him out, he evades the efforts of our senses ; we behold the work, but the workman is hidden from our eyes.”¹ And to the question where this Being is to be found existing, Rousseau replies : “ Not merely in the revolving heavens, nor in the sun which gives us light, nor in myself alone, but in the sheep that grazes, the bird that flies, the stone that falls, and the leaf blown by the winds.”² In the “ Creed of the Savoyard Priest ”³ he contends specifically against materialism, his objection being that it fails to account for the origin of the motion of the atoms.

As already suggested, the ethics of a system is the most convenient doctrine by which to decide whether a writer is “ naturalistic ” in the philosophical sense. The ethical doctrine typical of Naturalism is Hedonism. Rousseau is un-

¹ *Emile*, p. 218. Cf. on this conception Heine, *Religion and Philosophy in Germany*, English Trans., p. 74 : “ The Hebrews conceive God as a tyrant armed with thunder ; Christians, as a living Father ; the disciples of Rousseau and the whole Genevese school regard him as a skilful artist, who has fashioned the world somewhat as their fathers constructed watches, and as experienced critics they admire the work and praise the celestial workman.”

² *Emile*, p. 237.

³ Cf. pp. 228-78.

doubtedly not a hedonist ; he clearly recognises the distinction between pleasure and happiness, putting into the mouth of Julie in *La Nouvelle Héloïse* the words, "we have sought pleasure and happiness has fled from us," and in the *Emile*¹ saying, "the nearer we are to pleasure, the further we are from happiness." It is nevertheless the case that in the moral training of Emile Rousseau advocates that Emile should be subjected to the discipline by natural consequences, but this method he restricts to the negative or preventive stage of moral education, the later positive stage comprising indirect moral instruction in the form of fables, historical biographies, and direct moral instruction on economic and sex relations. Of Rousseau, indeed, even more truly than of Herbart, it might be said that he made morality the end of education.

By temperament Rousseau was condemned to be an idealist.² The new psychology classifies individuals into two types, the "introvertive" and the "extrovertive." To the former class Rousseau undoubtedly belongs. Psycho-analysis could doubtless reveal the cause, and the physical

¹ P. 44, cf. p. 140.

² J. Adams, *The Evolution of Educational Theory* (p. 252), says of Rousseau : "His whole theory of education . . . was in all probability in its origin nothing more than the reaction of his temperament on the surroundings."

disability—after Frederika Macdonald's study¹—could be hazarded. The latter may account for Rousseau's hostility to society which from this standpoint is something of the nature of a defence mechanism. The introvert, failing to adjust himself satisfactorily to external reality, seeks to adjust such reality to his method of conceiving it. He is a subjective idealist of the extremest sort, and his attitude is not theoretical but pathological.² The introvert has thus from the psychological and individualistic standpoint the same orientation as the objective idealist from the metaphysical and universal standpoint. Both would mould the world nearer to the heart's desire, but while the introvert would do this only partially and to suit his own selfish ends, the idealist would not rest content till he had reinterpreted the whole universe in accordance with the laws of his true universal nature. Rousseau, too, it may be remarked, restricts his railing to the social aspect of reality, and does not extend it to the physical aspect. He is prepared to conform himself and his pupil, Emile, to the natural law, but would

¹ *Jean Jacques Rousseau : A New Study in Criticism.*

² Cf. Rousseau's *Confessions*, bk. ix : "The impossibility of attaining real beings threw me into the region of chimera, and seeing nothing in existence worthy of my delirium, I sought food for it in the ideal world, which my creative imagination quickly peopled with beings after my own heart."

fain subordinate the social law to his own fancies.

This he admits in the *Confessions* when he says : " I would love society as much as any man, were I not certain to exhibit myself in it, not only disadvantageously, but totally different from what I really am." ¹ Later in the same work ² he explains at greater length : " Thrown into the world in despite of myself, without having its manners, or being in a situation to adopt and conform myself to them, I took it into my head to adopt others of my own, to enable me to dispense with those of society. My foolish timidity, which I could not conquer, having for principle the fear of being wanting in the common forms, I took, by way of encouraging myself, a resolution to tread them underfoot. I became sour and a cynic for shame, and affected to despise the politeness which I knew not how to practise. This austerity, conformable to my new principles, I must confess, seemed to ennable itself in my mind ; it assumed in my eyes the intrepidity of virtue, and I dare assert it to be upon this noble basis that it supported itself longer and better than could have been expected from anything so contrary to my nature." The blame he, of course, throws on society : " If I have a dislike for the society of mankind,

¹ Bk. iii.

² Bk. viii.

it is more their fault than mine,"¹ although the error of this procedure he rightly diagnoses and denounces in the case of those who rail against nature—"mad men, who continually cry out against nature! Know that all your evils proceed from yourselves."²

When we trace the source of Rousseau's anti-social bias and of his return to nature as the cure for all the world's troubles, which are merely the obverse and converse sides of the same principle, we are confirmed in our view that Rousseau's standpoint is idealistic. The anti-social attitude was assumed by Rousseau in his early *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, and its origin has occasioned much controversy.³ Kant, however, in his essay *On the Bad Principle in Human Nature*⁴ regards this standpoint as common to Seneca and Rousseau, thus affording a clue to the origin of Rousseau's attitude and thereby indicating the possible source of the material of Rousseau's *Discourse*.

In the *Emile* Rousseau makes a passing reference to Seneca's letter,⁵ "On Liberal and Vocational

¹ *Confessions*, bk. v.

² Bk. viii.

³ Cf. W. Boyd, *The Educational Theory of Jean Jacques Rousseau*, ch. iii.

⁴ Abbott's Trans. of *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 326.

⁵ *Epistulæ Morales*, LXXX, viii.

Studies." A liberal study, according to Seneca, was a study that made man free, and this idea of freedom in Education was adopted by Rousseau and may be regarded as the keynote of the *Emile*. But it is from Letter XC—"On the Part Played by Philosophy in the Progress of Man"—that Rousseau derived the inspiration for his *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*. Seneca therein argues that nature suffices for what she demands, whereas luxury has turned her back upon nature. "A thatched roof," he says, "once covered free men ; under marble and gold dwells slavery." "Follow nature," he advises, "and you will need no skilled craftsmen." Of the contrivances of civilization he declares : "Reason did devise all these things, but it was not right reason. It was man, but not the wise man that discovered them." The analogy between Seneca's *Letter* and Rousseau's *Discourse* is so close as to justify us in inferring that the latter was derived from the former.¹ Locke in *Some Thoughts concerning Education* makes repeated references to Seneca, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that it was

¹ The avoidance of the subject actually set for the prize essay (cf. W. Boyd, *The Educational Theory of J. J. Rousseau*, p. 60), and the line of treatment adopted by Rousseau reinforce the contention made above. Rousseau had attained facility in reading Latin authors (*Confessions*, bk. vi) ; French translations of Seneca were, however, also available.

through his study of Locke that Rousseau was directed to Seneca's writings.¹

The Stoic attitude to Nature and man is analogous to that of Rousseau, and while the Stoics advocated living according to Nature and based morality upon the laws of the world as a whole, they were yet, as we have already seen, not naturalists, for, as Sorley explains,² "the world was interpreted as a rational or divine order. For them, Nature, Reason and God had the same meaning ; and the moral law could be described with equal accuracy, as the law of nature, or the law of reason, or the law of God." For Rousseau the voice of conscience is likewise the voice of reason and nature. "Let us obey the call of nature," he says³ ; "we shall see that her yoke is easy and that when we give heed to her voice we find a joy in the answer of a good conscience." Earlier in the *Emile*⁴ he had affirmed that " reason alone teaches us to know good and evil," and had

¹ On the specific question discussed in Seneca's *Letter* and Rousseau's *Discourse* Kant agrees with the position adopted by both these writers. Cf. "Rousseau was perhaps not so far wrong as it has been supposed, when he preferred the savage state to the state of civilization"—quoted by E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. ii, p. 552. Also *Lectures on Education* : "it is still a question whether we should not be happier in an uncivilized condition."

² *The Ethics of Naturalism*, pp. 188-9.

³ *Emile*, p. 251.

⁴ P. 34.

there explained, "Therefore conscience, which makes us love the one and hate the other, though it is independent of reason, cannot develop without it." Rousseau can thus be aligned with Seneca on the one side, and as we shall see, with Kant on the other.

Rousseau's general attitude may be inferred from a separate consideration of his views on Nature, man and society. All the virtues which he could deny to man as a member of society and of which his primitive man had no need, Rousseau unhesitatingly ascribes to Nature; thus, "all that comes from her will be true."¹ Not only so, but it is also good. "God makes all things good," he says in the *Emile*,² and "whatever is, is good."³ Man's endowment, being natural, must likewise be good. Locke had maintained that the mind, instead of being by nature evil and desperately wicked, was a *tabula rasa*: Rousseau goes beyond this, and maintains that the first impulses of Nature are always right; there is no original sin in the human heart, the how and the why of the entrance of every vice can be traced.⁴ Dealing with the education of Sophie he repeats that all our natural inclinations are right. Fichte in his *Addresses to the German*

¹ *The Origin of Inequality* in Everyman Trans. of *The Social Contract and Discourses*, p. 176.

² P. 5.

³ P. 334.

⁴ *Emile*, p. 56.

People¹ has asserted that it is an absurd slander on human nature to say that man is born a sinner, and Fröbel in *The Education of Man* regards as treason to human nature the modern view that the endowment of the child is non-moral, claiming "surely the nature of man is itself good." Kant *On the Bad Principle in Human Nature* refers to this view, suggesting that it is probably a good-natured hypothesis of moralists from Seneca to Rousseau designed to urge man to the unwearied cultivation of the germ of good that perhaps lies in us, if one can reckon on a natural foundation for it in man.² For Kant himself, man is by nature neither good nor bad; he is free, and goodness or badness is a consequence of the exercise of his freedom; as Caird explains,³ "Kant cannot admit that moral evil or moral good are to be referred to anything which lies beyond the individual will." This is the position adopted by Hegel⁴: "by nature the child is neither good nor bad, since it is born with no knowledge of either good or evil." The conception that the child is by nature good, adopted by Rousseau,

¹ English Trans., p. 179.

² Abbott's Trans. of Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 326.

³ *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. ii, p. 596. Cf. *Kant on Education*, by A. Churton, p. 108.

⁴ F. L. Luqueer, *Hegel as Educator*, pp. 122-3.

Fichte, Fröbel, is nevertheless the warrant for the freedom of the child in some modern developments of educational practice.

Rousseau's view of political society and institutions was evidently a generalisation from his own unfortunate experience. As he explains in the *Confessions*¹ : "The justice and inutility of my complaints left in my mind seeds of indignation against our foolish civil institutions, by which the true welfare of the public and pure justice are always sacrificed to I know not what appearance of order, in reality destructive of order, which does nothing more than add the sanctions of public authority to the oppressions of the weak and the iniquity of the powerful." This view of society he expresses in general form in *The Origin of Inequality*² : "Such was, or may well have been, the origin of society and law, which bound new fetters on the poor, and gave new powers to the rich ; which irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, eternally fixed the law of property and inequality, converted clever usurpation into unalterable right, and, for the advantage of a few ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind to perpetual labour, slavery and wretchedness." In an ideal condition of affairs there would be no opposition between nature and society ; this Rousseau recognises in the *Emile* where he

¹ Bk. viii.

² P. 221.

writes¹ : " If there is any cure for this social evil, it is to be found in the substitution of law for the individual ; in arming the general will with a real strength beyond the power of any individual will. If the laws of nations, like the laws of nature, could never be broken by any human power, dependence on men would become dependence on things ; all the advantages of a state of nature would be combined with all the advantages of social life in the commonwealth. The liberty which preserves a man from vice would be united with the morality which raises him to virtue." This approximates to Kant's view which Caird expresses thus² : " The freedom that struggles against social necessity, must ultimately discover that it is only in the social organism that the individual can be really free."

Specific comparisons between the views of Rousseau and Kant can readily be instituted. Thus Kant's dualism—the phenomenal or scientific world characterised by necessity, the noumenal or ethical world by freedom—is formulated by Rousseau in *The Origin of Inequality*³ in the following terms : " It is not so much the understanding that constitutes the specific differ-

¹ P. 49.

² *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. ii, p. 561. Cf. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, English Trans., p. 163.

³ P. 184.

ence between the man and the brute, as the human quality of free-agency. Nature lays her commands on every animal, and the brute obeys her voice. Man receives the same impulsion but at the same time knows himself at liberty to acquiesce or resist: and it is particularly in his consciousness of this liberty that the spirituality of his soul is displayed. For physics may explain, in some measure, the mechanism of the senses and the formation of ideas; but in the power of willing or rather of choosing, and in the feeling of this power, nothing is to be found but acts which are purely spiritual and wholly inexplicable by the laws of mechanism." Kant's test of the moral rightness of an action was that it could be universalized: Rousseau expresses the same idea when he says¹ that everyman is virtuous when his particular will is in all things conformable to the general will, and we voluntarily will what is willed by those whom we love. That respect for the pure form of the law is the only right motive to moral action, as Kant maintains, is implied in the statement in the *Emile*² that a good action is only morally good when it is done as such and not because of others. Referring to political rather than to moral action Rousseau expresses the same principle in the words³:

¹ *Discourse on Political Economy*, Everyman Trans., p. 262.

² P. 68. ³ *Discourse on Political Economy*, p. 257.

"The first of all laws is to respect the laws; the severity of penalties is only a vain resource, invented by little minds in order to substitute terror for that respect which they have no means of obtaining." Kant's fear that impulse, appetite or desire might enter into and contaminate the goodness of the purely moral act might have found expression in Rousseau's statement¹: "The mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty." Kant connects virtue with happiness rather than with pleasure, and would approve of Rousseau's statement, quoted earlier, that the nearer we are to pleasure, the further we are from happiness.

The most systematic statement of Rousseau's philosophical position is to be found in the "Creed of the Savoyard Priest" set forth in the *Emile*,² and although Rousseau does not adopt the method of rigorous metaphysical analysis which Kant applied, their conclusions are in general agreement. Dispensing with the preliminary stage of doubt with which Descartes prefaced his speculations before arriving at the *Cogito ergo sum* which he took as the touchstone for all truths which he was justified in accepting, the Savoyard Priest resolved to accept as self-evident all that he could not honestly refuse to believe, and to

¹ *Social Contract*, p. 19.

² Everyman Trans., pp. 228-78.

admit as true all that seemed to follow from this. He accepts as fact his own existence, the existence of the senses through which he receives impressions and of the objects giving rise to these sensations. He nevertheless recognises the necessity for a synthetic activity to combine sensations of different sensory modes into one perceived object, and in thus recognising the active participation of mind in perception Rousseau anticipates Kant. Rousseau likewise recognises the existence of "Gestaltqualitäten"—objects of a higher order,¹ which are not given in sensation and which presuppose intellectual synthesis. He thus anticipated much of the criticism later directed against the empiricist standpoint. In considering external reality Rousseau evades the difficulties of the relation between the sensation and the quality, the ego and the cognised reality, by dismissing them as inexplicable: "it is no more possible for me to conceive how my will moves my body than to conceive how my sensations affect my mind." The problem for Rousseau is not the relation between mind and matter, but between matter and motion;

¹ P. 233: "To see two things at once is not to see their relations nor to judge of their differences. . . . These comparative ideas, *greater*, *smaller*, together with number ideas of *one*, *two*, etc., are certainly not sensations, although my mind only produces them when my sensations occur."

"matter receives and transmits motion, but does not produce it." This view of the externality of motion to matter is so at variance with modern theories of matter and energy as to give the argument only historical interest, but Rousseau's emphasis on motion is a recognition of a factor which Descartes neglected in making mind and matter the two ultimate concepts, and his insistence on its importance is in agreement with modern physics. On it are also based his proofs for God's existence. Motion has two forms—spontaneous or voluntary, and transmitted or acquired. The former is fundamental, and on the analogy of his own voluntary movement Rousseau concludes that it must have a similar cause; he is thus led to formulate the first article of his creed : "There is a will which sets the universe in motion and gives life to nature." From the laws of nature and the orderly arrangement resulting from the motion in the universe Rousseau infers an intelligent directing cause : "If matter in motion points me to a will, matter in motion according to fixed laws points me to an intelligence."¹

¹ While Kant has demonstrated the invalidity of the argument from design on which Rousseau relies, Rousseau and Kant are at one in contending that by a dialectical argument alone, the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. Thus Rousseau says of God : "He hides himself alike from my senses and my understanding."

Faith in the existence of a divine being is, according to Rousseau, not incompatible with the fixity of natural law but necessitated by it. It need hardly be said that a divine intelligence ordering the course of Nature is incompatible with a naturalistic philosophy.

Inconsistent with the orderly arrangement of Nature which leads Rousseau to deduce the existence of a divine being are the ways of man, as Rousseau consistently regards them. To remove this obstacle Rousseau has recourse to a dualistic view of human nature as drastic as that necessitated by Kant's rigorism ; thus Rousseau says¹ : "While I meditated upon man's nature, I seemed to discover two distinct principles in it ; one of them raised him to the study of eternal truths, to the love of justice, and of true morality, to the regions of the world of thought, which the wise delight to contemplate ; the other led him downwards to himself, made him the slave of his senses, of the passions which are their instruments, and thus opposed everything suggested to him by his former principle. When I felt myself carried away, distracted by these conflicting motives, I said, No ; man is not me ; I will and I will not ; I feel myself at once a slave and a free man ; I perceive what is right, I love it, and I do what is wrong ; I am active when I listen to the voice of

¹ P. 241. Cf. also p. 256.

reason ; I am passive when I am carried away by my passions ; and when I yield, my worst suffering is the knowledge that I might have resisted." Freedom, for Rousseau, requires no explanation ; "it is not the word freedom that is meaningless, but the word necessity." Man judges between good and evil as he judges between truth and falsehood¹ ; his intelligence is the power that determines his judgment, and beyond that Rousseau does not consider it necessary to go. Immortality depends on the fact that as the soul is an immaterial substance, the dissolution of the natural body does not necessitate the destruction of the soul ; this is precisely Plato's argument in Book X of the *Republic* : "everything is destroyed only by its own connatural evil and vice," but the conception of an immaterial substance Kant showed in his treatment of the antinomies in the *Critique of Pure Reason* to be self-contradictory.

Having dealt with the fundamental doctrines—God, freedom and immortality, Rousseau proceeds to examine the principles of conduct. These he finds in the depths of his own heart : "what I feel to be right is right, what I feel to be wrong is wrong ; conscience is the best casuist." Conscience is for him at once the voice of reason and the voice of Nature ; it is to the soul what

¹ Gentile in *The Reform of Education* employs the same argument ; see end of this chapter.

instinct is to the body ; he who obeys conscience is following Nature. Rousseau is aware of the inconsistencies of conscience over which the sceptic makes merry, having in mind those instanced by Montaigne¹ ; he might equally have referred to Locke's *Essay*.² In fact the method adopted by these writers and by modern sociologists is a valuable support to Naturalism. To these examples of relativity Rousseau opposes the uniformities of the modes of conduct, and by emphasising the universal principles of morality reinforces the idealistic contention³ that without objectivity there is no morality. Conscience, for Rousseau, speaks with a voice that is universal, not individual, and the will of the good man is for him, as for Kant, a universally legislative will. Thus : " Whenever there is feeling and intelligence, there is some sort of moral order. The difference is this ; the good man orders his life with regard to all men : the wicked orders it for self alone. The latter centres all things round himself ; the other measures his radius and remains on the circumference. Thus his place depends on the common centre, which is God,

¹ Doubtless the *Essay*, " Of Custom " : " The laws of conscience, which we say proceed from nature, rise and proceed of custom."

² *On the Human Understanding*, bk. i, ch. iii.

³ E.g. Hastings Rashdall, *Ethics*, p. 35.

and on all the concentric circles which are his creatures." Rousseau also maintains that in man there is an innate capacity for morality. This has been eloquently expressed by R. L. Stevenson, between whose writings and those of Rousseau there are interesting parallels. Everywhere, says Stevenson,¹ we find people "keeping the point of honour and the touch of pity, often repaying the world's scorn with service, often standing firm upon a scruple, and at a certain cost, rejecting riches: everywhere some virtue cherished or affected, everywhere some decency of thought and carriage, everywhere the ensign of man's ineffectual goodness: ah! if I could show you this! if I could show you these men and women, all the world over, in every stage of history, under every abuse of error, under every circumstance of failure, without hope, without help, without thanks, still obscurely fighting the lost fight of virtue, still clinging in the brothel or on the scaffold, to some rag of honour, the poor jewel of their souls! They may seek to escape, and yet they cannot; it is not alone their privilege and glory, but their doom; they are condemned to some nobility; all their lives long, the desire of good is at their heels, the implacable hunter."² The same doctrine is succinctly expressed by

¹ *Across the Plains.*

² Cf. Francis Thompson's *The Hound of Heaven*.

Rousseau in the question : " But do you think there is any one man upon earth so depraved that he has never yielded to the temptation of well-doing ? "

That Kant was influenced by Rousseau we have given sufficient evidence. If further demonstration were demanded, we could cite Kant's *Lectures on Education*, doubtless the least systematic and least original of his writings. Both Rousseau and Kant in their educational schemes have merely elaborated and generalised Locke's one short rule of physical education : " That gentlemen should use their children as honest farmers and substantial yeomen do theirs."¹ Kant's dependence on Rousseau has not escaped the former's commentators,² but even more generous in his acknowledgments to Rousseau than his commentators is Kant himself. The passage in which Kant has spoken of the change in disposition effected in him by Rousseau runs : " I myself am by inclination an investigator. I feel an absolute thirst for knowledge, and a longing unrest for further information. There was a time when I thought all this constituted the real worth of mankind, and I despised the rabble who knew

¹ *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, § 4.

² E.g. Paulsen's *Kant*, English Trans., p. 40; Wallace's *Kant*, p. 27; Caird's *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. i, p. 60.

nothing. Rousseau has shown me my error. This dazzling advantage vanishes, and I should regard myself as of much less use than the common labourers if I did not believe that this speculation (that of the Socratic-critical philosophy) can give a value to everything else to restore the rights of humanity.”¹ We conclude then that not only must Rousseau be regarded as an idealist, but that for educational purposes it is also better to approach the writings of Kant from the standpoint of Rousseau than from that of Hume or Leibniz, as is customary in Philosophy.

Kant, “the true founder of modern German philosophy,” sought to establish the validity of the concepts of scientific knowledge, of morality, and of religion, and thus to refute the scepticism which had resulted from the adoption by philosophy of Locke’s empirical standpoint and Hume’s relentless application of Locke’s “plain historical method.”² Kant’s problem expressed in its simplest and most general terms was a twofold one, to account for freedom in the moral sphere and necessity in the scientific sphere. It was with the latter problem that he dealt first, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the problem how to account for the conviction of necessity which

¹ Quoted by Paulsen, *Kant*, English Trans., p. 39.

² Cf. *Critique of Practical Reason*, English Trans., p. 100: “Universal empiricism reveals itself as absolute scepticism.”

characterises scientific laws or for the fact that in our ordinary thinking we *conclude* from this to that.¹ Kant formulated his problem in the well-known question—How are synthetic *a priori* propositions possible? In seeking an answer to this question he was forced to recognise that such synthetic activity of mind was involved not merely in judgments characteristic of the scientific world but even in all knowledge and experience; thus his problem assumed the more general form—how to account for experience in general. It was this problem which Locke had earlier set himself, although by his assumption that the mind is but the passive recipient of impressions received from the outside world he prejudiced his procedure, thereby drawing upon himself the condemnation of Fichte,² who characterised Locke's doctrine as “the worst of all philosophical systems.” Psychology, which owes much to Locke's method of procedure that was so unfortunate for metaphysics, has itself been forced to abandon Locke's position and to emphasise for its own requirements the synthetic or creative activity of mind. It is to Kant's credit that he anticipated this development, and that he sought by a complete inversion of the empiricist position, by investigating the activities

¹ *Critique of Practical Reason*, English Trans., p. 97.

² *Characteristics of the Present Age*, Lecture VII.

of the knowing mind, to account for human experience.

The problem Kant formulated for himself in the *Critique of Pure Reason* was to account for synthetic *a priori* propositions. The *Critique of Practical Reason* might likewise be regarded as an attempt to account for a certain type of synthetic proposition, namely, the synthesis involved in the relation between virtue and happiness. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* he demonstrated the validity of the concept of necessary causal connection which is indispensable to natural science : in the *Critique of Practical Reason* he established the validity of the concept of freedom which is an indispensable postulate of morality. The latter he accomplished by restricting speculative reason to empirical knowledge and extending the employment of practical reason to the establishment of the existence of God and of the necessity for immortality. By removing the conceptions God, freedom and immortality beyond the range of speculative inquiry Kant thereby removed them beyond the attacks of scepticism. "Their use is limited simply to the practice of the moral law,"¹ that is, they are ethical necessities. Kant's creed is not, "I believe in the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the freedom of man," but, "I will that there be a God, that my existence

¹ *Critique of Practical Reason*, English Trans., p. 235.

in this world be also an existence outside the chain of physical causes, and in a pure world of understanding, and lastly that my duration is endless.”¹

As Kant attributes primacy to the practical reason, he has been claimed by modern pragmatists as an exponent of their doctrine. But while he gives priority to the sphere of will over that of intellect² he maintains that this is not an outcome of a conflict between them, since it “is necessary for the possibility of any employment of reason at all that its principles and affirmations should not contradict one another.”³ At most such a conflict would merely be a contest between two aspects of reason—the practical and the speculative, not a conflict between reason and other aspects of mind. While the primacy of the practical reason over the speculative does not necessarily involve the subordination of the latter in its own sphere to the former, it has also to be noted that the will to which the intellect might even be regarded as subordinated is a universally legislative will, not the will of the modern pragmatists which is marked by its assertion of its own individual nature, and is

¹ Ibid., p. 241.

² Kant expressly states (Ibid., p. 92) that this is not due to any imperfections or incompleteness in speculative reason, “for this is for its own purpose complete.”

³ Ibid., p. 216.

frequently synonymous with a subjective wish or desire which cannot affect natural law, for, as Kant warns us,¹ "we are in no wise justified in assuming on account of what we wish on merely subjective grounds, that the means are possible or that its object is real." Even if it be admitted that Kant subordinates the speculative to the practical reason, he does not, like modern pragmatism, subordinate reason to instinct and impulse or to an emotional postulate. His defence of the primacy of practical reason, while the basis of his idealism, cannot consequently be cited in support of Pragmatism, Humanism or Personal Idealism, with which it has practically nothing in common.

By attributing supremacy to the practical reason Kant constitutes the ethical sphere the complement of the scientific world. He likewise calls in religion to redress the incompleteness of the moral sphere, but expressly declares that he does not thereby deprive the moral law of its absolute-ness nor does he propose to derive the sanctions of morality from religion. Thus he affirms ² that it is not necessary "to suppose the existence of God as a basis of all obligation in general (for this rests, as has been sufficiently proved, simply on the autonomy of reason itself)"; and repeats ³: "The moral laws lead through the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

² *Ibid.*, p. 222.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 226.

conception of the *summum bonum* as the object and final end of pure practical reason to religion, that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions, that is to say, arbitrary ordinances of a foreign will contingent in themselves, but as essential laws of every free will in itself." The moral and religious attitudes are thus different aspects of the same function, and although the religious is necessary to make the moral complete, the latter is not thereby made dependent on religion. To explain the relationship between morality and religion, no better distinction can be employed than that between the supreme good and the complete or perfect good which Kant himself employs in explaining the relation between virtue and happiness. "The *summum*," he says,¹ "may mean either the supreme (*supremum*) or the perfect (*consummatum*). The former is that condition which is itself unconditioned, that is, is not subordinate to any other; the second is that whole which is not a part of a greater whole of the same kind." Thus while virtue is the supreme good, happiness is necessary to make the *summum* complete, so morality is supreme, that is, unconditioned, while religion is necessary to make the whole complete or perfect. While a life without religion may therefore be

¹ *Ibid.*, 206.

regarded as incomplete, morality is likewise indispensable, and the authority of the moral law is left unimpaired by the demand that religion is necessary to complement morality.

The moral law, for Kant, requires the freedom of the individual's will and the universality of his actions. The determining factor of the individual's will, if it is also to be the determining factor of the will for everyone, cannot be the matter, but only the pure form, of the law, and the only possible motive compatible with this is respect for the pure form of the law ; as the will finds its principle of determination in the pure *form* of the law, it consequently remains a free will. "Thus freedom and an unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other."¹ It is consequently because the freedom of the will is at stake that Kant strives by all the means in his power to preserve the purity of the motive that determines man's actions and to eliminate any impulse, inclination or desire originating in man's physical or sensible nature which would compromise this purity. For beings constituted as we are the moral law appears as a law of duty, of moral constraint ; "the notion of duty, therefore, requires in the action, objectively, agreement with the law, and, subjectively in its maxim, that respect for the law shall be the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

sole mode in which the will is determined thereby.”¹ Like Wordsworth after him, but with an austerer vision, seeing not the smile upon its face which the poet beheld, Kant is led to apostrophise duty thus² :

“ *Duty!* Thou ‘sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that would arouse natural aversion or terror, but merely holdest forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind, and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience), a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly counter-work it ; what origin is there worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all kindred with the inclinations ; a root to be derived from which is the indispensable condition of the only worth which men can give themselves ?

“ It can be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself (as a part of the world of sense), a power which connects him with an order of things that only the understanding can conceive, with a world which at the same time commands the whole sensible world, and with it the empirically determinable existence of man in time, as well as the sum total of all ends (which totality alone suits such unconditional practical laws as the moral). This power is nothing but *personality*, that is, freedom and independence of the mechanism of nature, yet, regarded also as a faculty of a being which is subject to special

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

² *Ibid.*, p. 180.

laws, namely, pure practical laws given by its own reason ; so that the person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to his own personality as belonging to the intelligible (supersensible) world. It is then not to be wondered at that man, as belonging to both worlds, must regard his own nature in reference to its second and highest characteristic only with reverence, and its laws with the highest respect."

In the *Methodology of Pure Practical Reason* Kant outlines the procedure by which the ideal of duty can be brought to operate effectively in the individual's life. The term "methodology" he employs not in the usual sense of an exposition of the general principles underlying a science but in the special sense of the application of moral principles to individual conduct : "by this methodology is understood the mode in which we can give the laws of pure practical reason access to the human mind, and influence on its maxims, that is, by which we can make the objectively practical reason subjectively practical also."¹

That human conduct can be influenced by an ideal so abstract and pure as that proposed by Kant might reasonably be questioned, but the very possibility of morality depends on the susceptibility of the individual to this type of influence, "and if human nature were not so

¹ Abbott's Trans. of *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works*, p. 249.

constituted, no mode of presenting the law by roundabout ways and indirect recommendations would ever produce morality of character." But that this, the highest stage of moral evaluation, cannot be forthwith assumed or attained, Kant was ready to admit, even affirming that "in order to bring an uncultivated or degraded mind into the track of moral goodness, some preparatory guidance is necessary, to attract it by a view of its own advantage, or to alarm it by fear of loss." But he continues¹: "As soon as this mechanical work, these leading-strings, have produced some effect, then we must bring before the mind the pure moral motive, which, not only because it is the only one that can be the foundation of a character (a practically consistent habit of mind with unchangeable maxims), but also because it teaches a man to feel his own dignity, gives a power unexpected by himself, to bear himself from all sensible attachments so far as they would fain have the rule, and to find a rich compensation for the sacrifice he offers, in the independence of his rational nature and the greatness of soul to which he sees that he is destined."

The means Kant proposes to adopt to secure this end is not that of stories and the method that of suggestion, but argument or discussion regarding the moral worth of this or that action.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

Rousseau had contended that it was injudicious to argue with children regarding the morality of actions, condemning Locke, quite unjustly, for reasoning with children,¹ whereas all that Locke had intended was that children should be "treated as rational creatures."² To illustrate the futility of justifying moral values to children, Rousseau reports in the *Emile*³ the following dialogue :

Master. You must not do that.

Child. Why not ?

Master. Because it is wrong.

Child. Wrong ! What is wrong ?

Master. What is forbidden you.

Child. Why is it wrong to do what is forbidden ?

Master. You will be punished for disobedience.

Child. I will do it when no one is looking.

Master. We shall watch you.

Child. I will hide.

Master. We shall ask you what you are doing.

Child. I shall tell a lie.

Master. You must not tell lies.

Child. Why must not I tell lies ?

Master. Because it is wrong, etc.

"That is the inevitable circle," comments Rousseau. "Go beyond it, and the child will not understand you."

¹ *Emile*, Everyman Trans., p. 53.

² *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, § 81.

³ *Emile*, Everyman Trans., p. 54.

Teachers have to recognise that the ultimate appeal is to the good itself. As Boutroux puts it,¹ "To the question : ' Why should one do this and avoid that ? ' the teacher can give but one reply, the only one, after all, possible to a human being. This is good, that is evil." Kant would have approved the contention of Rousseau and Boutroux that no sanction intelligible to children can be given for the ultimate moral standard, that the only satisfactory proof is a transcendental one—that morality is rooted in the nature of things—but the type of argument he projects concerns not the question of the nature and validity of the final standard of worth, but, this being acknowledged, the comparative merits of certain chosen actions when measured by the standard.² A like attitude has been adopted by a present-day writer. Among the new interests emerging at adolescence she notes the study of moral problems if presented in the right way, and adds³ : "Free and open discussion of personal and collective rights and duties . . . should be encouraged, clearness about these

¹ *Education and Ethics*.

² Cf. A. Churton, *Kant on Education*, p. 81. Children "must not be allowed to argue about everything. It is not necessary for them to know the principles of everything connected with their education ; but when the question of duty arises, they should be made to understand those principles."

³ H. M. Mackenzie, *Freedom in Education*, p. 109.

being essential to true freedom." Instead of debating "certain chosen actions," as Kant proposed,¹ the prefects in a New Discipline school or the citizens in the Class-room Republic debate actual incidents challenging constituted authority or interfering with the tenour or efficiency of their little community, and in this way school themselves into treating dispassionately the more serious moral problems of later life.

As Kant conceived it incumbent on him to explain how the ideal of duty in all its purity and abstractness could be reduced to the level of practice, so the task that fell to his immediate successors was to explain how the transcendental conception of freedom was to be harmonised with subjection to authority and discipline in the training of the immature mind. Kant himself recognised that this was one of the greatest problems of education : "How to unite submission to the necessary restraint with the child's capability of exercising his free will—for restraint is necessary. How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of the restraint? I am to accustom my pupil to endure a restraint of his freedom, and at the same time I am to guide him to use his

¹ Kant suggested the use of a catechism of right conduct, containing, in popular form, everyday questions of right and wrong. For instances see A. Churton, *Kant on Education*, pp. 103-4.

freedom aright. Without this all education is merely mechanical.”¹ The difficulty was complicated by the current misunderstanding of the term *transcendental*; it was regarded as synonymous with transcendent and was thought to imply that the will was totally unmotived. For this reason we find Herbart declaring² that not the slightest breath of transcendental freedom must blow through any cranny into the domain of the educator; he also says³ that we must not be surprised to find that the doctrine of transcendental freedom which emanated from Kant is at the same time a doctrine of fatalism, especially in regard to the temporal development of all actions and opinions. Yet he could maintain⁴ that education would be tyranny if it did not lead to freedom.

Fichte felt the force of this difficulty. In his *Addresses to the German People* he seeks to recall

¹ *Kant on Education*, p. 27. Cf. Luqueer, *Hegel as Educator*, p. 176: “The aim of education is to make man an independent being; that is, a being whose will is free. To this end many checks are put upon the desires of children. They must learn obedience, so that their self-will and their dependence upon the desires of sense be done away with, and thus their will made free.”

² *Minor Pedagogical Works*, English Trans., p. 96.

³ *Umriss pädagogischer Vorlesungen*, § 5, Anmerkung (not included in English translation).

⁴ *Berichte an Herrn von Steiger*, i.

the German people to a sense of their own national self-respect, to teach them that they may still be masters of their fate, that although defeated they need not also be despised. Their salvation, he proclaimed, could only be secured by a new order of things, by the development of a new spirit, for "whatever has lost its independence has at the same time lost its power to influence the course of events."¹ The regeneration that is requisite can in Fichte's view only be effected by education ; "it is a total change of the existing system of education that I propose as the sole means of preserving the existence of the German nation."² The defects of the old system were that it had neither a true conception of education for manhood nor the power to realise that conception ; more specifically he declares³ : "In order to define more clearly the new education which I propose, I should reply that that very recognition of, and reliance upon, free will in the pupil is the first mistake of the old system and the clear confession of its impotence and futility. . . . Henceforth education for manhood must be taken from the influence of this mysterious and incalculable force and put under the direction of a deliberate art, which will surely and infallibly accomplish its purpose with everyone entrusted to it ; or

¹ *Addresses to the German People*, English Trans., p. 10.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-2.

which, if somehow it does not accomplish it, will at least know that it has not done so, and that therefore the training is still incomplete. The education proposed by me, therefore, is to be a reliable and deliberate art for fashioning in man a stable and infallible good will."

Fichte cannot quite resolve the antinomy of necessity and freedom in man; there is some justification for accusing him of inconsistency in dealing with this problem.¹ The difficulty has been felt by later writers and arises from the fact that freedom is not so much a "datum" in education, as an ideal to which even after all our striving we only imperfectly attain. The poet's conception² of freedom as a development is right when he exhorts:

Build thee more stately mansions, O my soul,
As the swift seasons roll !
Leave thy low-vaulted past !
Let each new temple, nobler than the last,
Shut thee from heaven with a dome more vast
Till thou at length art free,
Leaving thine outgrown shell by life's unresting sea.

The child is thus not born free; his apparent freedom is merely an intermittent servitude. A freedom of caprice, a liberty of indifference, makes

¹ Cf. G. F. Turnbull, *The Educational Theory of J. G. Fichte*, p. 94.

² O. W. Holmes, "The Chambered Nautilus."

him the slave of every passing whim, of every chance desire.¹ It is this freedom that Fichte condemns ; thus he says² : " Freedom, taken in the sense of indecisive hesitation between several courses equally possible, is not life, but only the forecourt and portal to real life. At some time or other there must be an end of this hesitation and an advance to decision and action ; and only then does life begin." The problem, as it appears to Fichte, is not whether man is free, but rather what kind of freedom he possesses. Thus he says³ : " To the general question whether man is free or not, there is no general answer ; for, just because man is free in the lower sense, because he begins in indecisive vacillation and hesitation, he may be free, or he may not be free, in the higher sense of the word. . . . On the other hand, he, whose life is possessed by the truth and has become life direct from God, is free and believes in freedom in himself and others." The child, in fact, only wins his freedom gradually ; he grows in freedom, and is successful only in so far as he is capable of subordinating his present impulses to the attainment of more complete and higher purposes. Only when the individual has attained the philosophic insight of Plato's rulers, has become " the spectator of all time and of all

¹ Cf. W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i, p. 417.

² *Addresses*, English Trans., p. 120. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

existence," or when he can orient all things (in Spinoza's phrase) "*sub specie æternitatis*," can he be regarded as free in the fullest sense.

This gradual evolution of freedom, long neglected by philosophers, has not been overlooked by educationists. Plato in the *Republic*¹ writes: "This is plainly the intention of law and also of the government of children which consists in withholding their freedom, until the time when we have formed a constitution in them, as we should in a city, and until, by cultivating the noblest principle in their nature, we have established in their hearts a guardian and a sovereign, the very counterpart of our own: from which time forward we suffer them to go free." Locke, who announced that men are by nature all free, equal and independent, confesses that children are not born in this full state, though they are born to it: "Thus we are born free as we are born rational; not that we have actually the exercise of either; age that brings one, brings with it the other too. And thus we may see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may consist together, and are both founded on the same principle." Fröbel, an apostle of freedom in Education, is nevertheless reported² to have

¹ §§ 590-1.

² *Reminiscences of F. Fröbel*, by Baroness B. von Marenhoiz-Bülow, English Trans., p. 140.

replied to the suggestion : " You do not, then, concur in the axiom ' Everyone is born free, and brings the right of personal freedom into the world with him ' ? " " No," answered Fröbel, " not in this sense. Man, on the contrary, is born entirely fettered on all sides, and truly for this reason, that he can and must obtain freedom only by his own striving. Freedom cannot be bestowed upon us. God Himself cannot bestow it upon us, since it must be the product of our moral and intellectual unfettering, which it is possible to attain only by self-activity. Every individual has to free himself from the various fetters of his undeveloped condition of childhood by the help of educative influences." The same view is expressed by a modern writer thus : " The task of the educator is a strange one : to act on mind and conscience in such a way as to render them capable of thinking and judging of themselves, to determine initiative, arouse spontaneity, and fashion human beings into freedom. The work is as glorious as it is difficult ; it is something of like nature with divine creation."¹

If freedom is an ideal for the individual, it is a problem for the educator. The writers

¹ E. Boutroux, *Education and Ethics*, English Trans., p. 10. Cf. *Kant on Education*, p. 20 : " It is not enough that a man shall be fitted for any end, but his disposition must be so trained that he shall choose none but good ends."

whom we have just cited connect freedom with creation, self-activity, originality. This aspect is essential ; the child can only become free by exercising his freedom. But he can only exercise his freedom in an environment. Liberty or freedom is not an empty power ; as Kant's light dove piercing in her easy flight the air and perceiving its resistance, imagines that flight would be easier still in empty space, so many assume that freedom is only possible apart from environment, whereas an environment is necessary for its development. The Montessori system of education is frequently criticised on the ground that its sensory and didactic apparatus restricts the child's freedom, but the system is freer than the traditional system just in so far as it provides more material than the traditional class-room, and thus affords greater incentives to the child's activity. A more serious danger threatens from the social environment. Rousseau seeks to withhold the pupil from the social environment till he has formed a stable character in him. His objection to adult domination with its danger of repression is now generally admitted. The new freedom avoids this by introducing the discipline of the pupil by his compeers which admits the social factor without endangering his independence. The course of training in freedom is, then, to bring the child to adapt himself to a specially prepared environment,

not only submitting himself to its necessities but also controlling it as he increases in strength and skill ; at the same time he learns to participate in the government of others of his own age, and in turn to submit voluntarily to their government,¹ thus growing in freedom till he becomes politically a full member of an adult self-governing community and, morally, obedient to a perfect law which is self-imposed.

If Fichte did not quite attain to this view he did much to emphasise the importance of the spontaneous activity of the pupil, and it was this feature that attracted him to the work of Pestalozzi. The new education which Fichte proposed to the German people was to develop in the pupil creative mental activity ; it was to aim "especially and directly only at stimulating regular and progressive activity" ² ; knowledge, although an important part of the training, was not to be aimed at ; it was merely incidental. This mental

¹ Cf. Fichte, *Addresses*, p. 33 : "Under the new system of education the pupils, although separated from the adult community, will, nevertheless, undoubtedly live together among themselves and so form a separate and self-contained community with its organisation precisely defined, based on the nature of things and demanded throughout by reason. The very first image of a social order which the pupil's mind will be stimulated to create will be that of the community in which he himself lives."

² *Addresses*, p. 27.

activity would lead the pupil to learn with pleasure and love, and "this love exalts his personality and introduces him systematically and deliberately into a wholly new order of things"¹; it is the immediate preparation for moral training. The pupil will also be led to recognise that not only is he a member of human society, but that he is also "a link in the eternal chain of spiritual life and a higher social order."² Thus he is led to religion, and will perceive that "the spiritual life which really exists is one, the divine life itself, which exists and manifests itself only in living thought. He will thus learn to know and keep holy his own and every other spiritual life as an eternal link in the chain of the manifestation of the divine life."³ The ultimate aim of the new education advocated by Fichte is thus not simply the art of training the pupil to pure morality, but is rather the art of training the whole man completely and fully for manhood.⁴ The old education, he maintained,⁵ was able at best to train some part of man, but the new must train man himself; and "only the nation which has first solved in actual practice the problem of educating

¹ *Addresses*, p. 30. ² *Ibid.*, p. 37. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41. This includes moral, religious and intellectual training, but "nowhere did he describe the ideal artist."—E. Bergmann, *Fichte, der Erzieher zum Deutschtum*, p. 133.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

perfect men will then solve the problem of the perfect state.”¹

Fichte's views on education fulfil most of the requirements of an idealistic education, and in recent developments in educational practice they are being realised. The closest approximation to them in his own day to which Fichte could allude was the system of Pestalozzi, and while fully realising that Pestalozzi's practices departed in many respects from his principles,² Fichte nevertheless recognised that Pestalozzi's thought was infinitely more and infinitely greater than Pestalozzi himself.³

Pestalozzi's indebtedness to his predecessors is difficult to estimate, more especially his dependence, if any, on Kant.⁴ His own statement made in 1801 that for over thirty years he had not read a book is something of a hyperbole, as Wiget explains,⁵ for his letters throughout this period afford evidence that he had thoroughly acquainted himself with the German and English systems of

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

² Cf. *Patriotism and its Opposite* in Turnbull's *Educational Theory of J. G. Fichte*, pp. 160–80; also *Addresses*, ix et seq.

³ *Patriotism and its Opposite*, p. 164.

⁴ E. Bergmann, *Fichte, der Erzieher zum Deutschtum*, p. v: “From Luther the way goes right through Kant to Pestalozzi and Fichte.” Cf. P. Natorp, *Der Idealismus Pestalozzis*, pp. 21–2.

⁵ T. Wiget, *Grundlinien der Erziehungslehre Pestalozzis*, p. 4.

philosophy. His intercourse with visitors interested in philosophical and political questions may have served instead of personal study. Thus in 1793 he was visited by Fichte, who three years earlier had experienced what Bergmann designates his "Damascus" as the result of reading Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and who in 1791 had visited Kant himself at Königsberg; and it can hardly be doubted that Pestalozzi caught something of Fichte's enthusiasm for the new evangel. The idealism in Pestalozzi's writings may, however, have been directly derived from Rousseau, if our interpretation of Rousseau as an idealist, suggested above, is accepted, just as the educational ideal of Fichte, even before he came under Kant's influence, was more like that of Rousseau than Fichte himself would have guessed.¹

In recommending Pestalozzi's system to the German people Fichte maintained that in spite of his efforts to provide an education merely for the downtrodden, Pestalozzi evolved a universal system. "The soul of Pestalozzi's life was love for the poor neglected people; his love was so blessed that he found more than he sought, the sole means of salvation for all mankind. . . . In order then to understand him correctly and to value him fully, one must first and foremost grasp Pestalozzi's thoughts in this sense, not as the

¹ Cf. Bergmann, p. 45.

intellectual education only of the poor oppressed people, but as the absolutely indispensable elementary education of the whole future generation and of all generations from henceforth.”¹ This universal and common education for all is derived from Rousseau and Kant²—Bergmann refers to the democratic ethics of duty³—and from this time an idealistic and a democratic education have almost been synonymous. Pestalozzi’s aim of education, accepted by Fichte, namely, the development of manliness, including not only intellectual but also physical, practical, æsthetic, moral and religious development, implies the idealistic standpoint, but his idealism finds its most adequate expression in his *Letters to Greaves*.⁴ In these he clearly demarks the limits of Naturalism, asserting: “The animal instinct is a principle which knows no higher object than self. Self-preservation is the first point which it tries to secure; and in its progressive desire of enjoyment, self is still the centre of its agency. It is not the same with the mind, or with the affections of the heart. The fact which speaks most unquestionably for the spiritual

¹ *Patriotism and its Opposite*. Cf. *Addresses*, English Trans., p. 159.

² Cf. Bergmann, p. 45.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁴ *Letters on Early Education. Addressed to J. P. Greaves, Esq.*, by Pestalozzi. Translated from the German Manuscript (London, 1827).

nature of man, is the sacrifice of personal comfort or enjoyment, for the happiness of others ; the subordination of individual desire, to higher purposes." And he repeats : " While the animal is for ever actuated by that instinct to which it owes its preservation, and all its powers and enjoyments, a something will assert its right in man, to hold the empire over all his powers ; to control the lower part of his nature, and to lead him to those exertions which will secure for him a place in the scale of moral being."

Fröbel's educational writings reflect in quite unequivocal fashion the idealistic tendencies of his age. For this reason they still make an appeal to many who have rejected his pedagogical practices. He himself has acknowledged his indebtedness to Schelling's work *On the World Soul*, published in 1798, stating "what I read in that book moved me profoundly, and I thought I understood it" ; but the philosophical position adopted by Fröbel in the opening paragraphs of *The Education of Man* does not quite represent Schelling's attitude as set forth in this work. Schelling *On the World Soul* sought a principle which should reduce all nature to unity, and found it in the conception of matter as a force that always manifests itself in opposite directions.¹ Schelling premised that this principle must not be

¹ J. Watson, *Schelling's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 95.

sought in any transcendental supernatural region, whether called God or Fate, but it is just here that Fröbel finds his ultimate principle, for he commences *The Education of Man* by declaring¹: "In everything dwells and rules an eternal law. This law expresses itself, distinctly and clearly, alike in what is external to man—Nature; in what is internal to man—the Soul; and in what unites these two—Life. . . . As foundation of this all-ruling law, exists of necessity a conscious, almighty and eternal Being. . . . The one Being is God. Everything came forth from God, and by God alone is governed; so that the sole Foundation of all things is God. In everything God rules and lives. Everything rests and subsists in God. Things exist only because God acts in them." Fröbel's pronouncements here have rather an affinity with the earlier philosophy of Fichte, for whom Reason was a self-conscious activity manifesting itself in the contrast of self and not-self, a view that also had exercised a great influence on Schelling. But it is a needless task to attempt to fix precisely Fröbel's indebtedness to the great idealists, for in his *Autobiography* he confesses that at Jena—the philosophical Mecca of the time—he studied nothing purely theoretical but mathematics, and of philosophical teaching and thought he learnt only as much as

¹ Trans. by W. H. Herford.

the intercourse of university life brought with it ; indeed, as we have elsewhere suggested,¹ it was doubtless by Krause that he was most influenced, and between Fröbel's views and those of Krause there is a close correspondence.

Fröbel makes frequent use of the dialectical process, and while not disclaiming acquaintance with Hegel's method, he maintains that he does not know how Hegel had formulated and applied it. The principle of the unity of opposites is to be found in Schelling and was common to most of the writers of the day, and Fröbel's applications of it do not exhibit that inherent necessity which seems to drive Hegel from *thesis* to *antithesis* and then to their reconciliation in a higher *synthesis*. But the development of their thought moved along parallel lines, and each affected readers to whom the other would be unknown ; both too, as we should naturally expect, have much in common with Kant.

For Hegel, pedagogy is the art of making men ethical. It looks upon man as natural, and points out the way in which he is to be born again. His first nature must be converted into a second spiritual nature, in such a manner that the spiritual in him becomes a habit.² For Fröbel the aim of education is to produce a pure, faithful,

¹ *The Doctrines of the Great Educators*, pp. 249-50.

² *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. by S. W. Dyde, p. 161.

complete, and therefore holy life.¹ The realisation of such a spiritual aim cannot be left to nature. "Nature has placed no instinct in man for that purpose," says Kant, and Hegel repeats: "A man attains what he should, not by instinct. He must win his true place. On this is based the child's right to be educated." Education thus becomes of supreme significance. Thus Kant maintains that man can only become man by education,² and Hegel that man becomes what a man should be only through culture,³ and culture, Hegel explains, is in its ultimate sense a liberation and that of a high kind, involving a struggle against mere subjectivity, immediate desire, subjective vanity, and capricious liking, hence the hardness of the task and the disfavour under which it falls. For Fröbel the divine in man, which is his Essence, is to be unfolded and brought to his consciousness by means of education; and man himself is to be raised to a consciousness of living up to, and realising in freedom, the Divine which acts in him.

The task here assigned to education is more than one man or one generation can accomplish; "education is an art which can only become per-

¹ *The Student's Fröbel*, by W. H. Herford, i, p. 38.

² *Kant on Education*, by A. Churton, p. 6.

³ *Hegel as Educator*, by F. L. Luqueer, p. 108; also *Philosophy of Right*, p. 191.

fect through the practice of many generations.”¹ The principle of recapitulation is adduced to reinforce this view, Kant asking² : Should we in the education of the individual imitate the course followed by the education of the human race through its successive generations ? and Fröbel³ maintaining that each successive generation, each individual, has to pass through the previous stages of human development, but it must be by the living way of self-active growth, not by that of lifeless copying. It is doubtful, however, whether the principle has ever found nobler expression, and in a form freer from objection than in the words of Hegel : “The past,”⁴ he says, “is traversed by the individual, in the same way as one who begins to study a more advanced science repeats the preliminary lessons with which he had long been acquainted, in order to bring their information once more before his mind. He recalls them : but his interest and study are devoted to other things. In the same way the individual must go through all that is contained in the growth of the universal mind : but all the while he feels that they are forms of which the mind has divested itself—that they are steps on a

¹ *Kant on Education*, p. 10.

² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

³ *The Education of Man*, pp. 16-17.

⁴ *Phenomenologie des Geistes*, trans. by W. Wallace, *Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy*, 2nd edition, p. 279.

road which has been long ago completed and levelled. Thus, points of learning, which in former times tasked the mature intellects of men, are now reduced to the level of exercises, lessons, and even games of boyhood : and in the progress of the schoolroom we may recognise the course of the education of the world, drawn, as it were, in shadowy outline."

These three writers, Kant, Hegel and Fröbel, recognise the existence of stages in the individual's development, and that each stage has its own appropriate type of education. Kant assumes Rousseau's divisions, the stage of nurture, succeeded by the stage of culture having first a negative and later a positive aspect. Fröbel likewise accepts Rousseau's stages and designations—infancy, childhood, boyhood and youth, childhood being the age for play, boyhood for work. As *The Education of Man* was not completed, youth or adolescence was not treated by Fröbel, but the characterisation of adolescence by Hegel, who deals at some length with the ages of man,¹ is a worthy commentary on Rousseau's treatment.

By their acceptance of the recapitulation doctrine and their recognition of the stages in the individual's development Fröbel and Hegel approximate as closely to the idea of evolution as could

¹ *Hegel as Educator*, pp. 118-28.

be expected in pre-Darwinian days, and it argues a singular lack of historical sense to condemn them for their use of development by unfolding,¹ the only conception available in their day. These writers regard the educative process as a conflict between man's lower animal nature and his higher spiritual nature. They emphasise the self-activity of the pupil, Hegel maintaining that education must not suppress, but thoroughly encourage growing self-hood and independence ; and, in spite of certain passages which might be cited to the contrary, they believe in what is now termed the play-way in education. In these respects they have anticipated modern developments, but they have a philosophical basis for their views which many advocates of modern developments do not possess.

The position adopted by Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Fröbel has found expression in the writings of a present-day Italian educationist. In *The Reform of Education* we see Gentile undertaking " to shake Italy out of the doze of naturalism and positivism back to idealistic philosophy," or as Croce in the " Introduction " expresses it, " it would be better to say, to philosophy pure and

¹ Cf. W. Wallace, *Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy*, pp. 152-5.

For relation of Fröbel to Leibniz see the writer's *Doctrines of the Great Educators*, pp. 250-1.

simple." Almost repeating the words of Kant and Hegel, Gentile maintains that man has no infallible instinct like the animals to guide him naturally and unerringly, but must achieve his end by restless activity of mind : "Here, as in every other manifestation of his spiritual activity, man does not behave in sole conformity with instinct ; he does not teach by abandoning himself, so to speak, to the force of natural determinism. He is fully aware of his own doings. He keeps his eyes open on his own function, so that he may attain the end by the shortest course, that he may without wasting his energies derive from them the best possible results. For man reflects."¹

It is through education that man actualises his spiritual nature, and his spiritual nature is universal ; his personality is not the particular, empirical and exclusive personality of the pragmatists which Gentile characterises as an abstract concept ; it is a personality which because the spirit is universal activity, far from separating men, unites them, and when it truly wills, the entire world wills within it. This conformity of the individual spirit with the universal Gentile illustrates from language, pointing out that we do not restrict our individuality by employing a common tongue nor

¹ *The Reform of Education*, pp. 33-4. Cf. p. 135. He also remarks (p. 136) : "The animal does not work."

express it by using jargon and ciphers ; and our freedom is expressed in willing the will, not perhaps of our own particular state, but " of a super-national group in which my state coexists with other states, acting upon them, and being reacted upon in reciprocal determinations." ¹

If spirit is universal, it is also active. Man sustains the world of culture by recreating it ; " he who distinguishes his person from his knowledge is ignorant of the nature of knowledge." ² What guides man in his spiritual progress is not something external and alien, not " a celestial truth removed from the turmoil of earthly things," but something in his own nature ; " the lofty aim which is his law is within himself." ³ This development implies freedom, and Gentile does not restrict freedom, as did Kant, to the moral sphere ; man must be as free in the affirmations of his thought as in his actions ; in fact, for Gentile all judgments of value presuppose freedom ; it is the condition of the entire life of the spirit. Freedom then must be the result of education—" a school without freedom is a lifeless institution " ⁴ ; and like the German idealists Gentile has to confess that the most serious problem of education is to reconcile the liberty of the pupil with the authority of the teacher.

¹ Ibid., p. 31.

³ Ibid., p. 16.

² Ibid., p. 17.

⁴ Ibid., p. 62.

But he maintains that the limitation of the pupil's liberty is only apparent, that the antinomy is indeed resolved when the unity of aim of teacher and taught is recognised, "so that far from limiting the autonomy of the disciple, the master as the propulsive element of the pupil's spontaneity, penetrates his personality, not to suppress it, but to help its impulses and facilitate its infinite development."¹ By the very act of education itself the difficulty is removed. Unity ought to be our constant aim, he maintains.² Such false oppositions as that between discipline and instruction, between one type of education and another, for example, physical and mental, practical and humanistic, are the result of unphilosophical thinking and the failure to understand the precise nature of education.³

Interest in Gentile's work centres not in any novelty of standpoint or of treatment but in the fact that the present, like all previous ages, must, when dissatisfied with fragmentary accounts of life and education, turn to an idealistic philosophy for a treatment, which, if not complete, at least aims at completeness.

¹ Ibid., p. 63.

² Ibid., p. 191.

³ Cf. p. 240, The modern demand for integral education is evidence of the need for such a unity.

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COLLATERAL READING¹

CHAPTER I

Bode, B. H.: Fundamentals of Education, Ch. XII.
Clarke, F.: Essays in the Politics of Education, Ch. I.
Dewey, J.: Democracy and Education, Ch. XXIV.

CHAPTER II

Patrick, G. T. W.: Introduction to Philosophy.
Eucken, R.: Main Currents of Modern Thought.
Perry, R. B.: Present Philosophical Tendencies.

CHAPTER III

Adams, J.: The Evolution of Educational Theory, Ch. IX.
Nunn, T. P.: Education: Its Data and First Principles,
Chs. I-V.
Dewey, J.: Democracy and Education, Ch. XII.

CHAPTER IV

Horne, H. H.: The Philosophy of Education, Ch. IX.

CHAPTER V

Adams, J.: The Evolution of Educational Theory, Ch. X.
Haldane, R. B.: Mind and Reality.
Jones, H.: Idealism as a Practical Creed.

¹ A comprehensive Bibliography of Philosophy of Education is appended to H. H. Horne's *The Philosophy of Education*, revised edition, 1927.

CHAPTER VI

Buchner, E. F.: The Educational Theory of Immanuel Kant.
Turnbull, G. F.: The Educational Theory of J. G. Fichte.
Luqueer, F. L.: Hegel as Educator.
Gentile, G.: The Reform of Education.

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